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ABSRTACT
A large volume of literature shows that corruption affects economic growth through the
lowering of the level investment. Slow economic growth is associated with high poverty levels.
If corruption makes the voters economically and socially worse off, one expects the citizens to
punish the corrupt politicians by not reelecting them. However, evidence shows that even in
countries which are perceived to be highly corrupt, incumbents still do get reelected. Chad, for
example, is ranked the third most corrupt country in Africa according to the 2010
Transparency International Report, and yet in 2011 presidential elections the incumbent was
reelected. A possible explanation for voting for corrupt incumbent parties is that voters are not
informed or are misinformed about corruption. This study seeks to address (1) whether or not
voters in developing countries punish incumbent parties for corruption, (2) whether
information on the radios enhances reelection chances of the incumbent parties in developing
countries and (3) whether or not information about corruption changes the response of voters.
Analyzing 48 elections from 33 developing countries using probit, the study finds: (1)
corruption does not affect the reelection chances of incumbent parties in developing countries,
(2) radio broadcasts enhance the reelection chances of incumbent parties in developing
countries and (3) under certain circumstances, there seems to be some evidence that
information about corruption affects reelection chances of incumbent parties. The effect of
information about corruption depends on whether or not incumbent parties field different
candidates from the previous elections. In South and Central Americas, however, the effect
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also depends on whether or not the elections are free or fair. A key finding of the study is that
press freedom reduces the reelection chances of incumbent parties’ presidential candidates.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study seeks to understand the behavior of voters when the incumbent party is
perceived to be corrupt. Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as the abuse of public
office for private gain. The most odious forms of corruption include bribery and extortion. It also
includes the allocation of public resources to favored clients for political benefit. It is the view of
this study that corruption does not benefit the majority of the people, most especially the poor- a
proposition not all economists and political scientists subscribe to. Political scientist Samuel P.
Huntington (1968) argues that in over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracies, political bribes and
kickbacks can help cut through bureaucratic red tape and improve government efficiency.
Another reason some view corruption as good hinges on the key economic assumption that selfinterest enhances prosperity because competition ensures that a product is purchased by those
who value it the most; thus the firms that are willing to pay more in bribes are awarded the
contracts. However, as Lambsdorff (2001) argues, this type of invisible hand may not exist when
private actors deal with the government to provide products to the state or to demand publicly
controlled services.
The impact of corruption reverberates throughout the economy instead of being confined
to those engaged in the corrupt activity. Corruption affects the poor indirectly through its impact
on growth factors. Studies have shown that corruption impedes economic growth by
1

discouraging foreign and domestic investment (Mauro, 1995; Hines, 1995 and Wei,
1997), imposing a huge tax on businesses (Wei, 1997) and thus dampening entrepreneurship,
lowering the quality of public infrastructure (Mauro, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2002) decreasing
tax revenues (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), diverting public talent into rent seeking, and distorting
the composition of public expenditure (Mauro, 1998)). In addition, corruption distorts the legal
and policy frameworks, leading to increased income inequalities through the unfair distribution
of government resources and services and the progressivity of the tax system. Lower income
households, therefore, end up paying a higher proportion of their income in bribes than do
middle and upper classes (Chetwynd et al., 2003).
What is true, therefore, is that on the one hand corruption is rewarding to some
individuals; that is why they keep engaging in it. On the other hand, the majority of people, in
rural areas especially, are made worse off in the process. Access to basic needs, water and
medical services for example, is already a problem for the majority of poor people in rural areas,
and if they have to pay bribes for these basic services, then the problem is exacerbated. 1
Unfortunately most people in developing countries live on less than a dollar per day, so they
cannot afford to pay the bribe and therefore, cannot access the health services. Corruption in the
procurement of drugs and other health equipment also leads to the shortage of proper health
facilities. In addition, the rural masses may not benefit from dubiously awarded contracts when
the quality is compromised and in some instances when corrupt contractors fail to complete their
projects. In Malawi, for example, the Nyasa Times dated June 28, 2012 reported that eighty
percent of the boreholes awarded to contractors were shallower than the recommended 45

1

The UN Millennium Development Goals 2012 Report estimates that 11 percent of the world population remains
without access to improved sources of drinking water such as household connections, public standpipes, boreholes,
protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater collections. Forty percent of those without access to improved
drinking water sources live in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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meters. Shallow boreholes run the risk of running out of water quickly. Furthermore, the quality
of water from shallow boreholes is poor and poses a health risk to the people.
While the government may put institutions in place to fight corruption, the intertwining
nature of the causes and solutions of corruption makes these institutions less trustworthy,
especially in emerging democracies. It may be in the interest of a corrupt government to keep
these institutions weak so that government officials can continue to reap the benefits of
corruption without paying the consequences. Politicians may exploit institutions for their own
interest, especially when the heads of institutions are appointed by the president. Sadly, however,
reporting corruption may be risky due to inadequate legal protection for the whistleblowers in a
system that is very protective of the politicians in the incumbent party.
In democratic nations, elections may therefore, offer an opportunity for the voters to
express their attitude towards corruption without suffering consequences of whistleblowing. The
key question this study seeks to address is whether or not voters in developing countries punish
corrupt officials for corruption. If corruption makes citizens economically and socially worse off,
one expects them to punish corrupt politicians by not reelecting them. However, evidence shows
that even in countries which are perceived to be highly corrupt, incumbents still do get reelected.
Chad, for example, is ranked the third most corrupt country in Africa and eighth in the world (TI
Annual Report, 2010), and yet in the 2011 presidential elections, the incumbent party’s candidate
was reelected. 2
Rundquist and Hansen (1977) identify three possible reasons why voters reelect corrupt
incumbents. First, voters may be uninformed or misinformed about candidates. Second, voters

2

The World Health Organization polio coordinator was quoted by the IRIN expressing how corruption is affecting
the fight against polio in Chad “not enough of the money intended for polio campaigns makes it to the population in
Chad. This money disappears in the capital and never makes it to the health centers.” The coordinator reckoned only
sixty percent of the funds for polio vaccination campaigns were used to fight polio.
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may view corruption as necessary in order to speed up economic activities when government
agencies are not able to fulfill specific demands. Third, voters may trade their votes for some
material and/or financial advantages. A fourth possible reason, scarcely explored in empirical
literature, is electoral fraud. 3 In most developing countries, election outcomes are disputed
because of alleged electoral fraud. In the Kenyan 2007 elections, for example, the opposition
candidate refused to accept the election results claiming the Electoral Commission of Kenya
(ECK) manipulated the results in favor of the incumbent party’s candidate. A similar situation
was repeated in Kenya in the 2013 election when the losing candidate again challenged the
results in court. 4 The current study potentially tests whether or not electoral fraud plays a role in
deciding elections outcomes in developing countries.
Using a data set compiled from various data sources (Table 11), the current study models
the reelection chances of incumbent parties’ presidential candidates as a function of corruption,
electoral fraud, voter turnout and various control variables. (A detailed specification of the
econometric model is provided in Chapter 4). Corruption is measured by the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International. Electoral fraud is a categorical
variable, taking the value of 1 if an election is fraudulent and 0 if an election is free and fair. 5
Because electoral fraud is perceived to mostly favor the incumbent party, this study has the
potential to test whether corruption and electoral fraud reinforce each other or have opposite
effects.

3

Apart from the manipulating the figures, other possible ways used to commit electoral fraud include turning away
eligible voters on voting day or deliberately putting down voters name in voters roll in far away areas.
4
Raila Odinga is the opposition candidate who disputed the 2007 results. He was the presidential candidate for the
opposition Orange Democratic Party against the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Union. Raila
contested again in 2012 and disputed the results when he lost again. This time he lost to Uhuru Kenyatta of the
Jubilee Alliance, a coalition of The National Alliance, National Rainbow Alliance, United Republican Party and
Republican Congress
5
The fraud indicator is compiled by the World Bank Database of political institutions.
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While this study hypothesizes that because corruption affects citizens negatively, voters
punish corrupt incumbents by voting them out of office, it also potentially tests Rundquist and
Hansen’s (1977) arguments that voters may vote for corrupt incumbents because the voters are
misinformed or uninformed and that voters benefit from corruption. There are many channels
through which information is disseminated-radio broadcast, television broadcast, print media and
internet. In developing countries, however, radio broadcast is the main channel through which
people in the rural areas have access to information. The levels of per capita income in
developing countries make it difficult for people in rural areas to own televisions and personal
computers. In addition, the lack of electricity in rural areas makes it harder for the few that may
want to purchase such appliances. Since radios can be easily powered by batteries, it is highly
likely most people in rural areas own radios. Myers (2008) reports that radio is still the dominant
mass-medium in Africa with the widest geographical reach and highest audiences compared with
televisions, newspapers and other information and communicational technologies. A Gallup poll
conducted in 2008 found that about 59 percent of people in sub-Saharan Africa regard national
radio as the most important medium they use to keep well- informed about events in their own
country. The current study uses the number of radios per 1000 of population to measure the
amount of information that is disseminated to the voters. In addition, the study uses freedom of
press to capture the quality of information being disseminated.
Across empirical literature, the results on the effect of corruption on election outcomes
are mixed. For example, in Brazil’s mayoral elections, voters punish corrupt officials by not
reelecting them (Ferraz and Finan, 2008); while in Italy’s legislative elections, Chang and
Golden (2004) find that there is no significant difference in the reelection chances of corrupt
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officials and non-corrupt ones. However, extant literature is limited to developed countries. This
study adds to the literature by extending the debate to developing countries.
The covert nature of electoral fraud makes it difficult to measure. Those involved in
electoral fraud have an incentive to cover up or disguise it in some way. The ones that report it,
usually the losers, may be doing so because they lost the elections. In developing countries,
follow up on the allegations of fraud is difficult, especially after the winner has been sworn in.
The winner can appoint people from his/her party as heads of institutions (the judiciary, for
example) that are supposed to address the electoral complaints. In order to keep their jobs, the
newly appointed heads of institutions can frustrate complainants by prolonging the investigations
thereby making the process very expensive for complainants. Because of the failure to follow up
on allegations of fraud, it is difficult to verify the claims. This study, however, utilizes the World
Bank Database on political institutions assessment on whether or not elections are free or fair.
A non-trivial issue addressed in this study is that voter turnout is treated as an
endogenous variable. Hansford and Gomez (2010) argue that voter turnout is endogenous
because individual preferences of a candidate affect both voter turnout and election outcome.
Another reason they give is that closeness of an election increases the probability that an
individual vote can be decisive in determining the outcome and hence affecting both election
outcome and voter turnout. Another important contribution of this study is the variable that is
used to instrument for voter turnout (voting system laws). Hansford and Gomez (2010) use
rainfall on election-day as an instrument for voter turnout. In developing countries used in this
study, elections are held during the dry season; hence election-day rainfall is not an appropriate
instrument, as it does not have sufficient variation.

6

This study, therefore, makes three contributions to the literature on corruption and
election outcomes. First, the study assesses the election chances of incumbents in developing
countries. The extant literature is limited to developed countries. Second, electoral fraud is
included in the model as an explanatory variable. If electoral fraud plays a crucial role in altering
voters’ preferences, omission of the variable has serious consequences on the reliability of the
estimates. Thirdly, this study includes voter turnout as an endogenous explanatory variable and
uses a different instrument from what Hansford and Gomez (2010) suggest to use to instrument
for voter turnout.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature; Chapter 3
discusses the data. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology and the results. Chapter 5 concludes
and addresses some the challenges and suggests possible future solutions to improve on the
study.

7

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1.

CORRUPTION
While some people benefit from corruption, most studies agree that it has a negative

effect on the majority of individuals not involved in the transaction. For example Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) show that corruption leads to the misallocation of talents, which is
very costly for developing countries as less competent people or companies are hired to provide
public services. In spite of the evidence that corruption is detrimental to the well being of the
citizens, people still engage in corruption, causing some to wonder whether corruption might be
beneficial. This section provides a brief review of studies that have investigated the effect of
corruption on society and have found a negative impact on the well being of citizens.

2.1.1

THEORETICAL MODEL OF WHY CORRUPTION IS BAD
The objective of this section is to introduce some insights into the microeconomic theory

of corruption. The simplified model provided helps to explain why corruption has a negative
effect on those not directly involved in the corrupt practices. The model is an adaptation of the
pioneering work by Rose Ackerman (1975, 1978) who explores the relationship between market
structure, government preferences and the likelihood of corruption.

8

In the model, there are three types of economic agents, namely: the voter, the politician,
and service providers. The voter bestows the politician with the responsibility of allocating
public resources to meet the basic needs of the voter (health facilities, water, and road network).
All the purchasing decisions are made by the politicians. The politician seeks to maximize the
gains from any transaction, which may include bribes. The goal of the firm is to maximize its
profits. The firm is faced with a decision of whether or not to offer a bribe to a politician and the
size of the bribe as well if the firm decides to offer one. The size of the bribe offered by firm 𝑖 to
the politician is denoted as 𝑏 𝑖 . Assuming a 50 percent chance that the politician gets caught, the

expected penalty for the politician is denoted as 𝑝0 (𝑏 𝑖 ) = 𝑏 𝑖 ⁄2. The expected penalty is an

increasing function of the amount of bribe received. If 𝑤 denotes the perks and benefits forgone
in the event that the politician is forced to resign because of corruption, then the expected total
cost for the politician who receives a bribe, is (𝑏 𝑖 + 𝑤)⁄2. The expected gain to the politician
engaged in corruption is given as

𝜋 0 �𝑏 𝑖 � = 𝑏 𝑖 − 𝑝0 �𝑏 𝑖 � − 𝑤�2 =

(𝑏 𝑖 − 𝑤)�
2

(1)

With a 50 percent chance of getting caught, a rational politician accepts a bribe that is

higher than her perks and benefits. One can argue that compensating the politicians more may
help in reducing corruption because they stand to lose a lot. In addition, if the amount of the
bribe that the firms have to pay is high, it may deter them from paying engaging in corruption.
But when quality is introduced, the firms can offer more in bribes and make the citizens suffer
more by compromising on the quality of the service rendered. Another observation from (1) is
that the minimum size of the bribe the politician will accept declines as the probability of getting
caught declines.

9

Denoting 𝑚 as the per unit price offered in equilibrium, 𝑞 the quantity demanded by the

government on behalf of the citizens, 𝑇 𝑖 as firm 𝑖′s total cost of producing 𝑞 units, and 𝑝 𝑠 �𝑏 𝑖 � =

𝑏 𝑖 the expected penalty to seller 𝑖 and assuming that there is a 50 percent chance of the seller

getting caught and that the seller pays twice the amount of the bribe when caught, then the sellers
expected profit is, therefore, given as
𝜋 𝑖 �𝑏 𝑖 � = 𝑚𝑞 − 𝑇 𝑖 − 𝑝 𝑠 �𝑏 𝑖 � = 𝑚𝑞 − 𝑇 𝑖 − 2𝑏 𝑖

(2)

The seller will offer to pay a maximum bribe 𝑏 𝑖 = (𝑚𝑞 − 𝑇 𝑖 )⁄2 to ensure that seller is not
worse off than not paying the bribe. Thus, the firm with the lowest cost is likely to win the
contract since it can afford to offer the highest bribe.
Introducing quality of the service provided, 𝛼 𝑖 , and allowing for different prices charged

by firms yields seller 𝑖 an expected profit given as

𝜋 𝑖 �𝑝𝑖 , 𝑏 𝑖 � = 𝑚𝑖 𝑞 − 𝑇 𝑖 − 𝑏 𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖 �𝑏 𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖 ⁄𝛼 𝑖 �

The maximum bribe the firm will offer is 𝑏 𝑖 =

𝑚𝑖 𝑞−𝑇 𝑖 −(𝑚𝑖 )2 ⁄𝛼𝑖

(3)

1+𝑚𝑖

Thus, for a given price and quantity, the seller can increase the expected profits by

compromising on, 𝛼, the quality of the service provided. It is not uncommon in developing

countries to see low quality infrastructure, and in some instances, unfinished projects (See

Malawi’s example on page 3 about the borehole project). So construction companies increase
their profits at the expense of rural people’s quality of life.

2.1.2

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Mauro (1995) investigates the channels through which corruption and other institutional

factors affect economic growth and quantifies the magnitude of these effects. He observes that
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institutions and economic variables evolve jointly; not only do institutions affect economic
performance but also economic variables may affect institutions. In order to account for
endogeneity, he uses an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (which measures the
probability that two persons drawn at random from a country’s population will not belong to the
same ethnolinguistic group) as an instrument. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is highly
correlated with corruption and other institutional variables. Yet it can be assumed to be
exogenous both to economic variables and to institutional efficiency. Using a sample of 67
countries, he finds that the main channel through which corruption affects economic growth is by
lowering the investment rate. A one-standard deviation increase in the corruption index is
associated with an increase in the investment rate by 2.9 percent of GDP. Mauro (1995) uses an
older corruption index provided by Business International (BI). Many other studies that use other
indices 6 of corruption support Mauro’s findings.
Knack and Keefer (1995) use data from the Political Risk Service’s International Country
Risk Guide (PRS/ICRG). Incorporating corruption, among other explanatory variables, into one
single index of institutional quality, they find a negative impact on the ratio of investment to
GDP. Brunetti, Kisunko and Wader (1998) use the corruption index by the World Bank and
University of Basel for a sample of 41 countries and find that corruption significantly reduces the
ratio of investment to GDP. Mauro (1997) expands the sample size to 94 countries and uses the
PRS data used by Brunetti, Kisunko and Wader (1998) and find similar results. A negative
impact of corruption on the ratio of investment to GDP in African countries is reported by
Gymiah-Brempong (2002). Mo (2001) estimates the effects of corruption on economic growth
and analyzes the channels through which corruption affects economic growth. Using ordinary
least squares estimations, he finds that a 1% increase in the corruption level reduces the growth
6

Svensson (2005) find a correlation coefficient of at least .86 between CPI, ICRG and CCI.
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rate by about 0.72%. The study also further identifies the transmission channels through which
corruption affects economic growth. The first channel is through private investment. Regressing
the ratio of private investment to GDP on corruption and other control variables, Mo (2001) finds
a significant negative relationship between corruption and the ratio of private investment to
GDP. The second channel is the human capital channel and Mo (2001) finds that corruption has
a negative and significant relationship, with human capital measured by the average years of
schooling in the population over age 25. The third channel is through political instability, and
Mo (2001) finds a positive and significant relationship between political instability and
corruption. Private investment, human capital, and political instability in turn affect economic
growth.
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) study the effect of corruption on economic growth directly
and through the impact on investment, schooling, trade openness and political instability. The
results confirm Mo’s (2001) results that the channels through which corruption affects economic
growth are a private investment channel, a human capital channel and a political instability
channel. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) add the trade policy transmission channel. In addition,
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) study a longer time span than Mo (2001), and, instead of using
initial income like Mo (2001), they use the logarithm of initial income.
Furthermore, corruption renders a country unattractive to foreign investors. Wei (2000a)
detects a significant negative impact of corruption on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). He finds
that an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico is equivalent to
raising the tax rate by 20 percent. Aizenman and Spiegel (2006), using the BI data, find a
negative impact of corruption on the ratio of FDI to total capital accumulation. Lambsdorff and
Cornelius (2000) show an adverse impact of corruption on FDI for African countries. Other
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studies that find similar results include Smarzynska and Wei (2000), Henisz (2000), Wei
(2000b), Abed and Davoodi (2002), Doh and Teegen (2003) and Straub (2003).
With regards to the quality of the services provided, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) examine
the effect of corruption on the quality of public investments. Using panel data from PRS for
1980-95, they find that corruption lowers the quality of the infrastructure, as measured by the
condition of paved roads and power outages. They argue that a deteriorating infrastructure
increases the cost of doing business for both the government and the private sector and hence
leads to even lower quality services. Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson (2001) support Tanzi and
Davoodi (1997) in their study that examines the effect of corruption on the quality of public
health care provision. Using child and infant mortality as measures of the quality of health
services, they find that child mortality rates in highly corrupt countries are about one-third higher
than in low corrupt countries.
The studies discussed provide evidence that corruption negatively affects economic
growth directly or indirectly through its negative effect on investment. Countries with low levels
of economic growth are associated with high poverty levels. Moreover, corruption increases
income inequality. Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2000) argue that the benefits of
corruption are likely to accrue to the well connected at the expense of the poor; thus corruption
increases income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Since the poor seem to be
negatively affected by corruption, one expects them to protest against the incumbent party. In
democratic nations, elections provide a natural experiment to study the response of voters to
corruption. The next section, therefore, discusses studies that have looked at the response of
voters to corruption.

13

2.2

VOTER BEHAVIOR
The previous section has shown how corruption negatively impacts the well being of the

citizens. Of particular importance to this study is the voting behavior of citizens when the public
officials running for reelection are perceived to be corrupt. A considerable scholarly effort in
public choice has been devoted to studying the relationship between corruption and voter turnout
but not so much on the corruption-election outcome relationship. This section reviews the voter
behavior starting, from pioneering theoretical work of A. Downs (1957), who shows that
political behavior can be formulated from the assumption of maximizing behavior by the voters.
The subsequent studies are an attempt to explain why people still turnout to vote when Downs’s
model predicts otherwise. Empirical studies attempt to explain the paradox of voting by
assessing the socio-economic, political, institutional, and demographic factors that affect voter
turnout.

2.2.1

THEORETICAL REVIEW ON WHY PEOPLE VOTE
Downs (1957) advanced the model of a rational voter who personally weighs the benefits

against the cost of voting to her. Equation 4 captures the expected utility of voting for a voter:
𝑅𝑖 = (𝐵𝑖 𝑃𝑖 ) − 𝐶𝑖

(4)

where 𝑅𝑖 is the reward, in utiles, that an individual voter receives from his act of voting;

1
2
𝐵𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑈𝑡+1
)𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑈𝑡+1
)𝑖 is the difference in expected utility for the individual of the

election of his favored candidate over the election of his disfavored candidate; 𝑈 𝑥 is the utility
for the individual of election of candidate (𝑥 = 1,2); 𝑃𝑖 is the probability that the individual

voter’s vote decides the outcome of the election; and 𝐶𝑖 is the cost to the individual of voting, for
example time, spent on the whole exercise. So if 𝑅𝑖 is greater than 0, it is rational to vote, and if

𝑅𝑖 is less than 0, then it is irrational to vote.
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Since the probability of an individual vote influencing the outcome of an election is very
small, the cost of voting is normally higher than the expected benefits. Therefore, based on
Downs’s model, it seems irrational for an individual to vote. Downs model predicts low voter
turnout. This is called the paradox of voting or Downs paradox. Subsequent studies seek to
explain this paradox.
In order to explain Downs paradox, Riker and Ordershook (1968) expands Downs’
(1957) view by observing that in equation 4 the cost of voting has been categorized into two
2
parts: 𝐸(𝑈𝑡+1
)𝑖 , which is dependent on the outcome of the election, and 𝐶𝑖 , which is not. Based

on the same reasoning, they add 𝐷𝑖 (the benefits that are not dependent on the outcome of the
election). Equation 4 can then be rewritten as:
𝑅𝑖 = (𝐵𝑖 𝑃𝑖 ) − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖

(5)

𝐷𝑖 represents the voter’s sense of duty, the satisfaction from voting, and the desire to affirm

efficacy and partisanship. In this case, even if the probability of influencing the outcome is close
to zero, the individual may still vote if 𝐷𝑖 > 𝐶𝑖 . Riker and Ordershook (1968) testes the theory

using data collected by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, and the data
validated their prediction.
Stigler (1972) explains the paradox by introducing the demand side of voting, whereby
parties seek to maximize the benefits of the members. Unlike Downs, and Ricker and
Ordershook, the probability that one’s vote will make a difference is one. Stigler’s argument is
that if elections are not all-or-nothing and instead influence is an increasing function of vote
share, then one’s vote is very important. In this sense, voting is modeled as a consumption good.
Stigler uses the spatial competition model developed by Harold Hotelling. The conclusion from
Stigler’s analysis is that campaigning is an investment that plays to attract voters.
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The expected utility model of Downs (1957) postulates that a person will vote when the
expected benefit, computed as the probability P that the person’s vote will be decisive, multiplied
by the differential benefit B of the person’s preferred candidate exceeds the cost of voting. One
criticism of Downs (1957), and Ricker and Ordershook (1968), is the “paradox of voting”
(Ferejohn and Fiona 1974). Because the probability that a single vote will be decisive is
negligible even in close elections, the instrumental value of voting is also negligible even in
close elections. The question therefore still remains: why do people vote then? The minimax
regret model proposed by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), postulates that an individual chooses the
action for which the maximum error (regret) under the alternative possible election outcomes is
smallest. The implication of the expected benefit theory and the minimax theory is that early
projections affect the turnout in states where voting is still taking place when the projections are
made.

2.2.2

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON VOTER TURNOUT
The empirical literature on voter turnout is voluminous, and in this section, a brief survey

of the studies is provided. The studies seek to explain why people still turnout to vote even
though it may seem irrational for them based on Downs’s theory. Researchers have, therefore
resorted to investigating the socio-economic, political, and institutional factors that affect voter
turnout.
Barzel and Silberberg (1973) hypothesize that wealth maximizing behavior can explain,
in part, why people vote. They propose that an individual’s incentive to vote increases the larger
the estimate of benefits to be derived from the election of an individual’s favored candidate, the
smaller the cost of voting, and the larger the chance the individual perceives of hers being the
decisive vote. Empirically, they test their hypothesis using 1962, 1964, 1966, and 1968
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gubernatorial elections. Using OLS, they find that people tend to vote when the cost is low.
Barzel and Silberberg, observe that as the number of issues on the ballot increases, voter turnout
increases since the cost for each issue decreases. They also find that as the fraction of individuals
actually voting increases, the larger the probability that they will affect the outcome. Barzel and
Silberberg conclude that people do not vote solely as a civic duty but to maximize their wealth.
Since Barzel and Silberberg use OLS to estimate the coefficients, the question that arises
therefore, is whether or not this is the appropriate method of estimation since they deal with
panel data. In another study by Escaleras, Calcagno, and Shughart (2012), they argue that OLS is
the appropriate method of estimation. Another issue that can be raised about their estimation is
that they do not control for socio-economic factors.
Matsusaka and Palda (1997) evaluate the ability of common explanatory variables to
predict who votes. They estimate logit voting regressions with more than three dozen
explanatory variables using survey and aggregate data for the 1979, 1980, 1984, and 1988
Canadian national elections. Their finding is that demographic variables such as age and
education, and contextual variables such as campaign spending, have significant effects on the
probability of voting, but the models have a low R2 and cannot predict who votes more
accurately than random guessing. According to Matsusaka and Palda, this seems to suggest that
some important explanatory variables may be missing, or voting is an intrinsically random
behavior and hence unpredictable. In order to test if the regressions are missing important
variables that are constant over time, they use a person’s past voting behavior as a predictor of
future behavior, arguing that the missing factors will continue to drive the person to vote in the
next election. To test this, they add a dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual
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voted in the previous national election. Even though the inclusion of past voting behavior
improves the explanatory power of the models, it still is low.
Kunce (2001) analyzes the role of pre-election perceptions of the race closeness, by way
of newspaper polls, in motivating citizens to vote within-booth. Kunce argues that using an ex
ante measure of closeness is that voters are not “pulling the lever” with perfect information on
whether their vote will matter or not, but they go to vote uncertain as to whether their vote
matters. It is such uncertainty that will cause the voter to perceive that his vote matters. Using a
random effects analysis of state panel data from concurrent gubernatorial and senate elections for
the period 1986 to 1998, he finds no evidence to support the conclusion that can be drawn from
the Downsian hypothesis that perceived closeness matters. Kunce also finds that few longstanding variables, inherent in voting literature, have an impact on within-booth voting behavior.
Kunce suggests that this provides evidence that people vote for a variety of individuals, election
or district specific just like Downs theory. The analysis lends support to the proposition that
voting is to a large extent random.
Endersyby, Galaltas, and Rackaway (2002) argue that there is a discrepancy between
theory and empirical evidence because operational definitions of key concepts such as turnout
and election closeness are often inconsistent and limited in application to two party systems.
Endersyby, Galaltas, and Rackaway (2002) provide a more generalized test of the turnout and
competition link in districts. They use the 1993 and 1997 constituency–level election results for
the Canadian House of Commons. Canada provides an excellent case for comparison because it
has single-member districts, plurality elections, both national and regional parties, and multiparty
elections throughout the nation. They test different measures of competition found in literature
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and offer a new method of computing closeness in a multiparty context. 7 Their measure of
closeness is computed by taking the inverse of the Herfindahl index over votes for all candidates
on the ballot. Using this measure, they test independent effects of two-, three-, and four-party
contests on voter participation. They find that competition among two or three parties brings
more citizens to the polls. Their finding shows that their measure adds more explanatory power
to the model.
Cox and Munger (1989) explore the possibility that the relationship between closeness of
an election and turnout is not only through how the voter perceives her probability of influencing
the outcome, but also through the greater mobilization effort by those seeking a public office.
They explore the latter by using Federal Election Committee and state data on campaign
expenditures in House, Senate, and Gubernatorial races. Their results show that closeness has
significant effect on campaign expenditures. A close election might cause greater expenditure,
7

The other different measures of closeness tested by Endersyby, Galaltas, and Rackaway (2002) are :

Two- Party Margin: Two-party margin is the difference in votes between the first candidate and the runner-up
divided by the sum of the votes of the two candidates. The drawback to this measure is that in multiparty systems, or
in electoral contests with the presence of viable third candidates, the two- party margin can significantly
underestimate the competitiveness of the election.
Raw Vote Margin: The raw vote margin is the difference in votes between the first candidate and the runner-up. Cox
(1988) argues that using the two- party margin produces a spurious relationship between closeness and turnout since
the numerator in the dependent variable (turnout) is equal to or correlated with the denominator of the independent
variable (closeness). He suggests that raw vote margin is more superior to two-party margin. The weakness of this
measure is the same as the two-party margin.
Multiparty Margin: Multiparty margin is the difference in votes between the first candidate and the runner-up divide
by the total votes cast.

19

firstly, through increased contribution by those who feel that their contributions have a greater
chance of affecting the outcome. Secondly, those seeking favors from their preferred candidates
if they win will contribute more to ensure that their preferred candidate wins. Thirdly, the
candidates themselves may realize the need to mobilize voters; hence, they will borrow or
fundraise vigorously to ensure that they are elected. In practice, one finds that aggregate
contributions tend to be greater in election years. The next question Cox and Munger try to
answer is whether expenditure affects turnout. In their baseline model, which follows Patterson
and Caderia (1983), they find, as Patterson and Caderia and many others have, that the higher the
proportion of older people, the higher the turnout and also that turnout is significantly greater
outside the Old South. As for expenditure, the baseline results are insignificant. Cox and Munger
argue that the results are due to a misspecification error. They argue that because the total votes
cast appear by construction in the numerator of turnout and in the denominator of the two party
measure of closeness used by Patterson and Caderia and many others, the observed negative
correlation between the two may be spurious. Cox and Munger propose the use of the raw
margin. Another reason why they argue that the baseline model is misspecified is that an
important variable is omitted. Urbanized districts tend to have higher campaign costs and lower
turnout. When the issues above are accounted for, Cox and Munger find that campaign
expenditures do affect turnout. Carter (1984) analyzes the effect of early projections on turnout
using the 1980 US presidential election. President Reagan was projected as winner before some
polling stations closed. Carter finds that early projections do not matter, contrary to what the two
models predict.
Nitcher (2008) advances research on electoral rewards by specifying and testing a
mechanism by which parties can distribute particularistic benefits to mobilize supporters. At the
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heart of this study is the intriguing puzzle: how can “vote buying” coexist with the secret ballot?
Vote buying is typically understood as offering rewards in exchange for vote choices. Since
parties have no way of monitoring what happens in the polling booth, it raises the concern that
some individuals may accept rewards and then vote for their preferred candidates. Nitcher (2008)
offers a different mechanism that is easier to monitor than vote buying called turnout buying.
Unlike vote buying, which targets voters that are indifferent or favor the opposition but inclined
to vote, ‘turnout buying’ targets those that favor the party but are inclined not to vote.
Empirically, Nitcher (2008) tests turnout buying using Argentine survey data and finds that the
data are more consistent with turnout buying than vote buying. Initial descriptive statistics also
show that the Peronist party predominantly targets its own voters. Similarly, any activity that the
candidates engage in to mobilize supporters brings to question whether voter turnout does
guarantee victory for the incumbent. This is where this study enters the discussion. Turnout is
included as an explanatory variable.
The studies discussed above show that voter turnout is driven by both the voters as well as
the public office holders who seek the vote so that they retain power. Declining turnout rates
across democracies in recent years (Weisberg and Wilcox 2004; Franklin 2004) have led
researchers to turn to corruption as an explanation for declining voter turnout. There are two
contradictory views on the effect of corruption on voter turnout. One view is that corruption
pushes electorates to avoid the polls. Another view is that corruption is a mobilizing agent for
two reasons. Firstly, the electorate may mobilize to vote against corrupt incumbent parties.
Secondly, corrupt officials may mobilize voters by offering bribes in order that they may
continue to enjoy the benefits of corruption. The next section discusses the empirical literature
on the effect of corruption on voter turnout.
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2.2.3

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON
VOTER TURNOUT
Karahan, Coats, and Shughart (2006) test the hypothesis that government corruption

increases voter participation rates by analyzing the results of the 1987 county supervisor
elections in the 82 counties in the state of Mississippi. In 26 of the 82 counties, one or more
supervisors had been convicted of corruption on charges brought about by “Operation Pretense,”
an FBI sting operation that ran from March 1984 to late 1987. Holding constant the average
county voter turnouts in the 1984 U.S. presidential election, the average number of candidates
per seat, the number of incumbents running for reelection, and the average closeness of
supervisors races, they find that turnout was higher in counties where the incumbent was corrupt
than in those where the incumbent was not. The explanation is that public corruption leads to
increased competition for public office because of opportunities to earn bribes and other forms of
illegal compensation, which raise the returns for holding office. Higher payoffs for holding
office increase the intensity of consumption for voters. This increased demand for votes drives
the corrupt candidates to mobilize people to come out and vote. Campaign spending will
increase, more speeches will be made, more literature distributed, and more volunteers
dispatched to sway voters’ opinions. OLS is used to estimate the following equation:
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽5 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡

(6)

where turnout is the number of voters who turn out to vote as a percentage of registered voters;
incumbency is the number of candidates running for reelection in a county; corruption is a
dummy variable taking the value of 1 in counties where the FBI obtained convictions against at
least one of the county supervisors, and assigned a value of 0 otherwise; presidential turnout is
the voter turnout for the U.S. 1984 presidential elections used as a proxy for all unmeasured
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variables; average closeness is the average across the county’s supervisor’s races, where
closeness is measured by the winning supervisor’s margin of victory over second –place finish in
each beat; and candidates per seat is the number of candidates divided by 5, the number of seats
in a county.
Extending from Karahan et al. (2006), Escaleras, Calcagno, and Shughart (2012) tests the
hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of holding public office and hence elicit
greater demand for votes. In their case, they analyze a pooled time series datasets for U.S.
gubernatorial elections between 1979 and 2005 in 50 states. They find that public corruption is
relevant in explaining the variability of voter turnout rates. Like Karahan et al. (2006), Escaleras,
Calcagno, and Shughart (2012) use OLS. Their estimated model is:
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡

(7)

where turn is the logistic transformation of voter turnout, that is, 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = ln �1−𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡�, for state
i at time t. This transformation is necessary since turnout is a rate, restricted between zero and

one hundred. The 𝑋𝑖𝑡 vector is composed of the following socioeconomic variables: log of the

voting age population, proportion of population 25 years and over with a bachelor’s degree, the
state unemployment rate, log of state real per capita income, the poverty rate, and a dummy
variable to capture the differences across states. The 𝑍𝑖𝑡 vector comprises the following three

political variables: margin of the winning gubernatorial candidate’s victory over the candidate
placing second, concurrent presidential election, and the voter registration requirements.
Corruption is the number of convictions by state per year, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is assumed to be white noise.
The nature of the data may give rise to concern about account for some state specific

variables but Escaleras, Calcagno, and Shughart (2012) argue that pooled OLS is the appropriate
method to use rather than the fixed effects model. Their argument is that a number of the
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independent variables tend to be remarkably stable, creating a problem of multicollinearity with
state fixed effects. In order to account for a spatial correlation of errors, which may cause errors
to be consistent, they use a nonparametric covariance matrix estimator proposed by Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) that produces heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for estimates. The
corruption measure used in their study is the number of public officials convicted of corruption.
The two studies are similar in the sense that they both employ OLS and measure
closeness as the margin of the winning gubernatorial candidate’s victory over the candidates
placing second. One weakness of this measure arises when there is a third viable candidate. The
difference between the two studies includes (1) the dataset used and (2) the control variables in
the model. Unlike other studies that focus on the determinants of the electorate’s vote supply,
Karahan, Coats, and Shughart (2006) and Escaleras, Calcagno, and Shughart (2012) recognize
that the demanders of the votes (candidates) play a crucial role in mobilizing voters. While their
view is that the mobilization stems from the politicians’ effort, others contend that the
mobilization is a result of disgruntled voters seeking to remove the corrupt leaders from office.
Bratton et al. (2005) argues that citizens want clean and accountable governments, and if they do
not find transparency and effectiveness, they may turn out in large numbers to cast protest votes.
Inman and Andrews (2010) find that citizens in Senegal tend to show up in higher numbers when
faced with corrupt governments. Similar results are also reported by Johnston (1983).
The whole essence of politicians engaging in electoral engineering, however, is to
mobilize voters to vote for them and win elections so that they can continue maximizing the
benefits of holding office. While politicians hope that campaigning will increase voter turnout,
they have no control over what happens in the polling booth. This is where this study departs
from the studies that seek to understand voters’ behavior by focusing on voter turnout. Instead

24

this study seeks to understand the voter’s behavior by focusing on the election outcome, and
voter turnout is included as an explanatory variable to understand the corruption-election
outcome relationship. Endogeneity of voter turnout is also addressed in this study.

2.2.5

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON CORRUPTION AND ELECTION OUTCOME
The 1992 elections produced the greatest turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives

in more than 40 years, with 110 new members taking office in January 1993. According to
Jacobson and Dimock (1994), the most important contributor to the turnover was the House
Bank scandal. 8 The General Accounting Office Report (September 19, 1991) exposed that
hundreds of members of the House had written overdrafts on checking accounts with the House
Bank without the risk of being penalized. A number of studies have been conducted to detect
whether or not the corruption scandal resulted in the significant departure from the congress,
voluntarily or involuntarily, by those implicated in the scandal. Jacobson and Dimock (1994)
estimate an ordered logit model to test the likelihood of survival for those involved in the
scandal. Controlling for other factors that influence departures, they find that the more bad
checks written by a member, the more likely the member is to leave either through retirement or
losing a primary election. When it came to the general election, Jacobson and Dimock (1994)
established that the problem for those that wrote bad checks was less profound. Other studies that
establish similar results include: Groseclose and Krehbiel (1994), Hall and Van Houweling
(1995), Banducci and Karp (1994), Alford et al. (1994), and Stewart (1994). The studies reveal
that the scandal explains the retirements and primary defeats of those involved. However, the
studies find a higher survival rate for those that made it past the primaries. They find a survival

8

The House banking scandal broke in early 1992 when the US House of Representatives allowed the members to
overdraw on their House checking accounts without any risk of being penalized. Voters were infuriated that
Congress was playing by different rules than regular people.
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rate of about 80 percent for the members running for reelection who had written over a 100
overdrafts. The rate declines with fewer overdrafts written. Thus, as this instance shows, more
often than not corrupt public officials still get reelected.
Chang and Golden (2004) investigate whether corrupt representatives are vulnerable to
electoral retribution and loss of office. Using survival analysis techniques and logistic
regressions, they study the fate of members of the Italian lower house in the first eleven postwar
legislatures (1948-94). They find that judicial allegations for serious transgressions significantly
lower the probability of reelection by 7 percent. However, when they look at the eleven post war
legislatures separately, they find that in only two, are the members punished for serious
wrongdoing.

Moreover, their results show that 51 percent of those charged with serious

wrongdoings get reelected to national office compared to 58 percent of their honest counterparts.
The dependent variable in their model is reelection, which takes the value of 1 if the incumbent
wins the reelection. Two separate measures of legislative wrongdoing are used to distinguish
minor offenses from major ones. The variables take the value of 1 if incumbent is charged and 0
if not charged. No economic factors are included in the model. In addition to controlling for
economic factors, this study differs from Chang (2004) in two ways. Firstly, Chang (2004) is
country specific while this study is cross-country. Secondly, this study controls for voter turnout
while Chang (2004) does not.
In Japan, Reed (1999) finds that legislators lose only a few percentage points over their
previous vote shares when they are indicted or convicted of corruption. Sixty-two percent of
legislators convicted of corruption over the period from 1947 to 1993 were subsequently reelected.
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Krause and Mendez (2007) evaluate the question whether voters reduce their support for
an incumbent whenever they perceive an increase in corruption by looking at 28 countries and 93
election periods covering the period between 1995 and 2007. The set of countries used in the
study are European and North and South American. The corruption measure used is the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The dependent variable in their model is the gain (or loss) in
the share of votes received by the incumbent party with respect to the previous election. The
control variables used in the model include both economic and political. The economic control
variables include GDP growth, consumer price inflation and, in some specifications, the behavior
of unemployment. The political control variables include a measure of absolute government
support, a measure of the length of incumbent’s tenure (in years), the ideological classification of
the incumbent, the number of parliamentary seats controlled by the incumbent, and the degree of
fractionalization in the government. The model that Krause and Mendez (2007) estimate is:
𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝐶𝐼 + 𝛿𝐸 + 𝛾𝑃 + 𝜀

(8)

where 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ is the absolute change in the percentage of the popular vote captured by the
incumbent in any election with respect to the previous election; 𝐸 is a vector of economic

variables (growth and inflation); 𝑃 is a vector of political variables; and 𝑃𝐶𝐼 is the corruption
perception index. Their results suggest that a perceived rise in corruption in public office is

effectively punished by voters in an election. Furthermore, they find strong evidence that voters
punish corrupt practices more in the legislative form of government than the presidential form of
government. The reasoning behind this is that in presidential systems, voters perceive corruption
as an individual flaw, while for legislative systems, voters view the entire party as being corrupt.
Krause and Mendez (2007) also find that corruption is punished more severely in newer
democracies than established ones.
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Similarly, Peters and Welch (1980) assess the electoral impact of corruption on accused
candidates. Examining all the known instances where charges of political corruption or unethical
behavior were leveled against candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1968 to
1978, they isolate and determine the degree to which specific corruption allegations diminish the
electoral success of candidates. In their study, they consider the victory or defeat of allegedly
corrupt candidates and examine the impact of corruption charges on electoral turnout and
percentage of votes polled by the accused candidates. The regression equation that they estimate
is summarized as:
𝑌𝑝𝑣 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡−1 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡−2 𝑥𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 𝑥𝑗 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝛽𝑐 𝑥𝑐 + 𝑒

(9)

where 𝑌𝑝𝑣 is the predicted Democratic vote in the current election, 𝑥𝑡−1 is the Democratic vote in

the previous election; 𝑥𝑡−2 is the Democratic vote in the election four years before; 𝑥𝑖 is the

election effect dummy variable; 𝑥𝑗 is the incumbency and seniority measures; 𝑥𝑘 is income and

central city variables; and 𝑥𝑐 is a dummy variable for whether the case was one of corruption

allegation or not. Their results show that not only do a significant number of accused candidates

get defeated at the polls or resign before risking defeat, but also accused candidates suffer a
significant loss of votes in reelection bids. Overall, candidates accused of corruption appear to
suffer a loss of 6-11 percent from their expected vote. In order to explain the results, Peters and
Welch (1980) draw from Rundquist et al. (1977) and Rundquist and Hansen (1976), who
examine the reasons why voters would support corrupt politicians. The reasons include: (1)
voters may be uninformed or misinformed about the candidates; (2) voters may trade their vote
for material advantage, particularly economic reward; (3) voters may view corruption as
necessary in order to speed up economic activities, especially when government agencies are not
fulfilling a specific demand of citizens; and (4) voters may view corruption as just one of the
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factors they consider when choosing who to vote for, and, in some cases, it may be secondary to
other issues.
These results are similar to Krause and Mendez (2007) but different from Chang and
Golden (2004). The key difference between these opposing results could be the estimation
method used. For Chang and Golden (2004), the dependent variable is categorical (1 for
reelection and 0 otherwise) and therefore uses the logistic model. The other two studies use the
change in the percentage of vote obtained by the incumbent to examine whether the voters do
punish corrupt candidates. A reduction in the share of votes for the incumbent party’s
presidential candidate may indicate that voters punish corrupt politicians but that does not
necessarily mean they end up losing an election.
The current study adds to the literature on the effects of corruption on election outcome.
Unlike Karahan et al (2006) this study goes a step ahead to actually investigate whether turnout
translates into a victory for the parties involved. There are three specific areas that make this
study unique. The first is that, no cross-country study on the effect of corruption on election
outcomes has been conducted on developing countries. The other studies are either country
specific or conducted for developed countries. The second reason why this study is different
from the others is that this study includes turnout as an explanatory variable which other studies
do not. A priori we do not know who benefits from a large turnout, the incumbent or the
opposition. Thirdly, voter turnout in developing countries is treated as endogenous, and therefore
Instrumental Variable approach is used in a probit estimation. The variable used to instrument
for voter turnout is compulsory voting laws. The reason for the endogeneity is that electoral
commissions may suppress voter turnout by deliberately denying easy access to registration. The
motivation for doing this is that they too want to serve their own interests. Skewing the electoral
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process in favor of the incumbent increases the chances of them keeping their jobs, especially in
countries where the president does the appointment to the commission. Fourthly, electoral fraud
is included to test the claims by the losers that electoral fraud may have influenced the results of
the elections.

2.2.5

ELECTORAL FRAUD AND ELECTION OUTCOMES
One of the reasons advanced by the current study as to why voters may still end up voting

for corrupt government officials is that the incumbents may engage in electoral fraud. Schedler
(2002) broadly defines electoral fraud as the introduction of bias into the administration of
elections. Electoral fraud covers such activities as forging voter ID cards, burning ballot boxes or
padding the vote totals of favored parties and candidates. Lehoucq (2003) terms voting as a
classic social choice problem of how best to translate preferences into outcomes as people’s
votes are transposed into seat shares. The rules of voting in themselves are bound to be
controversial to some people. Electoral fraud can compound the problem by blocking the
citizenry’s preferences by denying voting rights to some citizens, while amplifying the voice of
others. Electoral fraud has become such an integral part of electoral competition even in
established democracies (Vorobyev 2010); hence its inclusion as an explanatory variable to
explain the reelection of incumbents. Competing parties use electoral fraud as a strategy to alter
the distribution of votes in their favor. In developing countries, disputed election outcomes have
often led to civil unrest. Yet academic research on whether electoral fraud is responsible for
changing election outcomes is scarce. According to Vorobyev (2010), the lack of attention to
electoral fraud is due to absence of a reliable measure of fraud. Lehoucq (2003) suggests several
types of sources that can provide valuable information for building a measure of fraud: press,
opposition parties’ archives with official acquisitions on fraud, complaints submitted to courts,
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scientific surveys and interviews with voters, and results of international electoral monitoring.
Vorobyev (2010) argues that the partisan nature of data sources limits the usefulness of those
sources. Furthermore, collection of the relevant data requires a tremendous effort. Developing
economies may not have the resources to investigate electoral fraud. In addition, there is no
incentive on the winning party to investigate electoral fraud if outcomes of the investigation can
implicate party officials. Myagkov and Ordershook (2008) suggest a statistical methodology
based on analysis of the distribution of turnouts over different regions and apply it to the official
data for Russian federal elections between 1993 and 2007 to uncover electoral fraud.
Theoretical and empirical studies on electoral fraud tend to focus on the different
strategies that incumbents can use to shape election outcomes in their favor, Glaeser and
Schleifer (2005) for example. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Shi and Svensson (2006), and
Guo (2009) document how the incumbents in developing countries can use the size as well as the
composition of the budget to influence the election outcomes. Chaturverdi (2005) and Collier
and Vicente (2010) investigate pre-election violence as an instrument for shaping electoral
results. The present goes further to test the claim the losers almost always make that their defeat
is due to the manipulation of the results by the EMBs in favor of the winner.
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CHAPTER 3

DATA DESCRIPTION

The current study uses data from 48 elections from 33 developing countries over the
period 2000 to 2010. The sample period is determined by the availability of CPI, which was first
compiled in 1995, but data for most developing countries have been available only since 2000.
The 33 countries include 15 African countries, seven South American countries and eight Central
American countries. 9 Twenty-two elections are from the Africa, while 14 are from South
America, and 12 elections are from Central America. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics
for all the countries included in the present study followed by detailed explanation of variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Name

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

0.625

0.489

0.000

1.000

Reelection

Definition
1 if reelected and 0 if not

∆ in corruption

Calculated from change in CPI

-0.078

0.572

-1.800

1.300

Radios

# of radios per 1000 of population

311.563

219.829

19.000

793.000

Press freedom

Higher number means more freedom

54.333

15.652

21.000

83.000

Turnout

% that vote divide by registered voters

65.139

14.735

36.240

94.550

Electoral Fraud

1 if election fraudulent and 0 if not

0.250

0.438

0.000

1.000

Level of democracy

Higher means more democratic

6.063

3.398

-4.000

10.000

∆ in GDP per capita

The change between two elections

96.435

318.346

-906.360

991.620

# of challengers

# of opposition presidential candidates

6.000

5.838

1.000

34.000

Same candidate

1 if sitting president runs and 0 if not

0.438

0.501

0.000

1.000

Region

1 if Africa & 0 if South and Central Am

0.458

0.504

0.000

1.000

9

The African countries are: Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia The Central American countries are: Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua. The South American
countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay.
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3.1.

REELECTION
Reelection is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the incumbent party’s

presidential candidate wins an election and 0 if not. Thus, in order to be assigned the value of 1,
the winner must either be an incumbent president or be from the same party as the incumbent
when the incumbent president is not allowed to contest. Most democratic nations place a
constitutional limit on the number of terms a president can serve. So the incumbent does not
contest after completing the maximum number of terms provided for by the constitution. 10 The
maximum number of terms varies from one to an open-ended arrangement like in the case of
Zimbabwe, which does not impose a limit on the number of terms. Table 13 in Appendix A
provides a list of countries and the maximum number of a president can serve.
From Table 1, it can be seen that in 62.5 percent of the elections included in this study,
the incumbent party’s presidential candidate gets reelected. The data for reelection are obtained
from three main sources, the Electoral Commissions of the various countries, Psephos: Adam
Carr’s Election Archives 11, and the Center on Democratic Performance 12 (CDP).

3.2.

VOTER TURNOUT
Voter turnout can be measured as the number of voters that turns out to cast a vote as a

percentage of registered voters or alternatively as a percentage of the voting age population
(VAP). Using the number of registered voters as the denominator leaves out eligible voters who
may not have registered to vote, while using VAP includes those that are not eligible to vote, like
non-citizens. The current study uses the former, but it will be interesting to test how the results
10

The incumbent may also be forced out of power if there was a military coup. Natural death or assassinations may
also force the incumbent party to have a different candidate.
11
An online archive of election statistics created in 1985 by an Australian journalist Adam Carr. Currently the
archive covers statistics for 182 countries.
12
The CDP was established in 1999 at Binghamton University as the Research Foundation Center for the State
University of New York. The center generates an Election Results Archive for 130 countries for the period between
1974 and 2002.

33

will change if VAP is used instead. Table 1 shows that the mean of turnout out in developing
countries is 65.14 percent.
It is important to note that different countries use different voting systems for the
presidential elections. Some countries use the plurality system while others use the majority
system. The majority system requires a run-off when no candidate reaches 50 percent plus one of
the votes. In case of a run-off, this study uses the second round turnout. The data sources for
turnout are the African Elections Database 13, Adam Carr’s Archives, the CDP, the Institute for
Democracy and Election Assistance 14 (IDEA) and the Electoral Commissions, in the respective
countries.
A priori, there is no way of knowing the direction of the influence of voter turnout on
election outcomes. If a large turnout is a result of one side being able to mobilize its base and
new voters, then that side may stand a better chance of winning an election. In some countries,
for example, access to remote areas may require a lot of resources, and the incumbent may have
an advantage over the opposition because the incumbent can use government resources to
campaign in those areas. The increase in voter turnout may increase the incumbent’s chances in
this case, but still there is no guarantee that the voters will vote for any particular candidate since
the voting is done secretly. Grofman, Owen, and Collet (1999) argue that a higher voter turnout
may be bad news for the incumbent party because core voters usually differ from peripheral
voters. Peripheral voters are, defined as those voters that do not like the status quo. Therefore,
the more involved the peripheral voters are the worse the incumbent party will fare in an
13

Created in 2004, the online database provides a comprehensive archive of past and present election results from
48 countries of the Sub-Saharan Africa. The data sources for the database include local online Newspapers from
country of research, official Government documents from country of research, Electoral Observer mission reports
and Web Archive (http://web.archive.org/)
14
Started in 1995, IDEA is an intergovernmental organization headquartered in Stromsburg, Sweden. The original
members of IDEA were Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, India, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and Sweden. Currently it has 27 members.
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election. The expected sign for voter turnout is, therefore, inconclusive.

3.3.

CORRUPTION
Corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted public power for private gain. The

examples include bribing of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, or embezzlement
of public funds. This study utilizes the measure of corruption compiled by Transparency
International 15 (TI). TI has scored and ranked countries from all around the world according to
perceptions of the extent of corruption in the public sector since 1995. The CPI ranges from 0 to
10. A higher score is an indicator that the respondents perceive the public officials as less
corrupt, while a lower score suggests the opposite. In order to have a higher number mean that
corruption is getting worse, the current study subtracts the CPI score from 10. A value of 0,
therefore, means that a country is free of corruption. Since the objective is to investigate the
effect of corruption on the incumbent party’s reelection chances, the appropriate measure of
corruption is the change in CPI between two elections to measure how corrupt a particular
regime is. Table 1 shows that the mean of the change in CPI is -0.078 indicating that on average
corruption has reduced.
An alternative to using CPI is the Corruption Control Index compiled by the World Bank.
The CPI measures corruption in the public sector while the CCI includes corruption in the
private sector. For the purpose of this study, CPI is more appropriate than CCI for because this
study emphasizes corruption in the public sector and not in the private sector. Secondly, using
CCI may leave out some elections. Until 2002, CCI was compiled every other year.

15

TI was founded in 1993 by Peter Eigen, a former regional director of the World Bank. Headquartered in Berlin,
German TI has 90 locally established national chapters. TI develops tools for fighting corruption and works with
other civil society organizations, companies and governments to implement them.
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By its very nature, corruption is deliberately hidden, making the gathering of information
problematic. Other studies have used the number of prosecutions in a country as a measure of the
level of corruption. Lambsdorff (2008) argues that the number of prosecutions does not reflect
actual levels of corruption but the quality of prosecutors. With regards to validity, Lambsdorff
(2008) argues that the credibility of the CPI is increased by the fact that its construction is based
on a combination of different data sources 16. Furthermore, being able to obtain information
about particular cases depends on freedom of information, the quality of anti-corruption
legislation and the effectiveness of the laws and institutions in terms of holding guilty parties
accountable. Given the fundamental challenges of gathering evidence-based data on corruption,
the CPI takes a different approach. This index brings together a number of different data
sources, 17 which capture perceptions of the extent of corruption in the public sector of a
country/territory. Perceptions data has been shown to correlate very well with other indicators
that use a more evidence-based approach. 18

3.4.

ELECTORAL FRAUD
It is not uncommon for defeated candidates to refuse to accept election outcomes, citing

electoral fraud as the cause of the defeat. In the 2012 Ghanaian elections, for example, the

16
The data sources include the Country Performance Assessment Ratings by the Asian Development Bank, the
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment by the African Development Bank, the Bertelsmann Transformation
Index by the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment by the World Bank’s
International Development Agency and International Bank of Rehabilitation and Development, the Economist
Intelligence Unit, Freedom House Nations in Transit, Global Insight Country Risk Ratings, the International
Institute for Management Development, Grey Area Dynamics Ratings by the Merchant International Group, the
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy and the World Economic Forum.
17
In 2011, seventeen separate surveys and assessments were used.
18
For example, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2010 asked people from 86 countries
whether they had paid a bribe for public services. The results show that ordinary people are more likely to have to
pay a bribe to access basic public services where corruption is perceived to be more prevalent. Similarly,
International’s Bribe Payers Index (BPI) captures perceptions of the likelihood of companies to pay bribes when
doing business overseas and the 2011 edition finds that in countries where the Corruption Perceptions Index scores
are low (highly corrupt) companies from these countries are seen as more likely to pay bribes when doing business
overseas.
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opposition candidate refused to accept the results, claiming that they were manipulated in favor
of the incumbent. 19 Kenya is also an interesting case. In 2007, the opposition 20 claimed that the
elections were rigged in favor of the incumbent. This resulted in an ethnic conflict that left over
1000 people dead. For the 2013 election, in order to avoid a repeat of the 2007 events, an
independent body, IECB, was hired to conduct the election. Yet the losing candidate did not
accept the results, arguing that the failure of the biometric machines which led to the manual
count was a deliberate ploy to manipulate the results in favor of the winner. The matter was
resolved in court in favor of the IECB.
Electoral fraud is, therefore, one of the control variables, but measuring it is not easy
because of its covert nature. Moreover, people may question the motive of complainants, since
they have an interest in having the results overturned. This study utilizes a measure compiled by
the World Bank political database, which rates elections as free and fair or fraudulent. A
fraudulent election takes the value of zero while a free and fair election takes the value of 1.
Using this measure of fraud has the advantage that it is available over the period of this study,
and it is from an outside source, which supposedly has no interest in influencing the outcome of
elections directly. Table 1 shows that in developing countries, only 25% of the elections are free
and fair.
3.5.

DEMOCRACY
The availability and quality of democratic institutions can influence the outcome of an

election. This study uses the democracy level of a country to control for the quality of
19

On December 28, 2012, Nana Akufo-Addo, the flag bearer of the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP); his
running mate, Mahamadu Bawumia, and the NPP National Chairman, Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, filed a petition
under Article,64 of the 1992 Constitution; Section 5 of the Presidential Election Act, 1992 (PNDCL 285) and Rule
68 and 68A of the Supreme Court (Amendment) Rules 2012, CI 74, challenging the election of President John
Dramani Mahama of the National Democratic Party (NDC)
20
The main opposition candidate in the 2007 election was Raila Odinga and he run against the incumbent Mwai
Kibaki. In 2013 Raila Odinga stood again for the Coalition of Democracy and lost to Uhuru Kenyatta, who ran on a
Jubillee Coalition ticket.
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institutions on the premise of a positive relationship between the level of democracy and the
quality of those democratic institutions. The Polity IV index is used to measure a country’s level
of democracy. Ranging from -10 for an extreme autocracy to +10 for most democratic, the
Polity IV index measures democracy by competitiveness of political participation,
competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints of
the chief executive. A score of +10 indicates a strongly democratic state; a score of -10 indicates
a strongly autocratic state. This variable is listed in the Polity IV dataset as polity. 21 The mean
the democracy variable is 6.06, an indication that developing countries are reasonably
democratic.
One weakness of the index is that it does not distinguish between a monarchy and a
single party regime. However, for this study that is not a problem because the countries included
in the study have indexes ranging from -6 to 10.

3.6.

NUMBER OF OPPOSITION CANDIDATES
A fragmented opposition increases the chances of an incumbent getting reelected. A

large number of opposition candidates may even be part of the incumbent’s strategy to divide the
opposition. With government resources to use, the incumbent can sponsor smaller parties in
opposition strongholds in order to increase the chances of winning the election. The number of
opposition candidates is used as a proxy to measure how strong an opposition an incumbent
faces. On average, in developing countries, there are six presidential candidates running against
an incumbent. Just like voter turnout, it is important to note that some countries require a 50+1

21

The Polity Index is compiled by Gurr. It comprises two main elements: (1) level of democracy and (2) level of
autocracy. Each government is assigned a number between 0 (no elements of democracy exist) to 10 (strongly
democratic). Similarly, each government is assigned a number between 0 (no autocratic elements) to 10 (fully
autocratic).
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majority to win an election, so the number of challengers is reduced to 1 in the runoff. The major
data source for the number of challengers is Psephos: Adam Carr’s Election Archive, while data
on population was obtained from IDEA.

3.7.

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Research has shown that economic conditions shape electoral outcomes. Good economic

performance keeps parties in power, and bad ones cast them out (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier,
2000). The findings are founded on the premise of economic voters who hold the government
responsible for the state of the economy. The present study uses the change in real GDP per
capita between two elections to capture how well an incumbent performed economically. In
developed countries, the unemployment rate plays a crucial role in informing the electorate on
the economic condition of a country. The unavailability of unemployment data in developing
countries leaves the per capita GDP as the best indicator for economic performance. The reason
for using the change in per capita GDP is the idea that in considering whether to reelect an
incumbent, voters consider how well off they were before the incumbent came to power and how
much their lives have improved. The mean of the change in real GDP per capita in developing
countries is 96.44, indicating an improvement in economic performance on average. The data for
both GDP per capita are obtained from the World Bank.

3.8.

INFORMATION
The amount and quality of information made available to the voters play a role in

determining the electoral outcome. If the incumbent is corrupt, it is to his advantage if the
corruption is not exposed. The media, therefore, plays an important role in influencing the
election outcome through the type of information that is disseminated. For the majority of the
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poor people in rural areas, radios are the best means through which information is passed. This
study uses the number of radios per thousand of population as a proxy for the amount
information. In order to control for the quality of information, an interaction term between the
number of radios per thousand of population and the corruption perception index is included.
This is done to test whether corruption is exposed or not. In addition, press freedom index is also
used to control for the ease with which reporters are able to expose corrupt practices without fear
of being persecuted. The mean of radios per 1000 of a population is 312, indicating that at least
30% of the people in developing countries have access to information from radio broadcasts.
Data on the number of radios is gathered from the World Resource Centre. Data on press
freedom is collected from the Freedom House.

3.9.

POWER OF INCUMBENCY
An incumbent president has an advantage over her competitors because she is already

known and can also use government resources for her campaign. Incumbent presidents can easily
disguise a political function as a state function and, in the process, use government resources to
finance their campaigns. In addition, the voters already know the incumbent president, so it is
easier for the ruling party to sell the candidate than the competitors. In order to control for the
power of incumbency, this study uses a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the ruling party
features a sitting candidate and 0 if the incumbent party changes its presidential candidate. Table
1 shows that in 42.8% of the elections, the incumbent party fields the same candidate.
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CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

The dependent variable in this study is categorical. One possible estimation method is
the usual probit maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). The probit estimation method is
appropriate only if the independent variables are exogenous. The probability that 𝑌 is equal to
one is described as

𝑝𝑟(𝑌 = 1|𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑊) = Φ(𝑋1 𝛽1 + 𝑋2 𝛽2 )

(10)

where Φ is the standard normal distribution. 𝑌 is the dependent binary variable,

reelection, taking on the value of 1 if the incumbent gets reelected or 0 if not. 𝑋1 is the

independent variable turnout, and 𝑋2 is a vector comprising corruption and other control

variables, namely: electoral fraud, level of democracy, change in GDP per capita, number of
challengers, same candidate, region, number of radios per 1000 of population, and freedom of
press. Also included in some of the model specifications are two interaction terms. The first one
is the interaction between corruption and the number of radios to capture whether or not the radio
stations air programs that expose corrupt practices in government and the impact of corruption
on the livelihood of the voters. The second one is the interaction between corruption and
freedom of press to capture whether reporters are free to expose the corrupt practices in
government without fear of being persecuted. Both of the interacted terms are exogenous.
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In the event that one of the independent variables is endogenous, estimating the probit
model in equation 10 yields biased and inconsistent estimates (Yatchew and Griliches, 1985). A
common solution to the problem of endogeneity is the use of instrumental variables (IV). For a
variable to pass as an instrument it must (1) be correlated with the endogenous explanatory
variable and (2) have no direct effect on the dependent variable. The use of exogenous
instruments allows the researcher to partition the variance of the endogenous explanatory
variable into exogenous and endogenous components. The exogenous component is then used in
the estimation. Following the Woodridge (2010) notation, the population model is therefore
described as
𝑌𝑖∗ = 𝑋𝑖1 𝛽1 + 𝑋𝑖2 𝛽2 + 𝑊𝑖 𝛾 + 𝑈𝑖

(11)

𝑌𝑖 = 1[𝑌𝑖∗ > 0]

(13)

𝑋𝑖2 = 𝑍𝑖 Π𝑧 + 𝑋𝑖1 Πx1 + 𝑊𝑖 Π𝑤 + 𝑉𝑖

(12)

where 𝑌, 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , and 𝑊 are as defined above, and 𝑍 is a vector of instruments for the

endogenous variable.

In order to account for the endogeneity, Rivers and Vuong (1988) suggest a two-step
approach, which has the advantage that the usual t statistic on the residuals is used to test for the
endogeneity of an explanatory variable. The first step of their procedure is to run the OLS
regression of equation (2) and save the residuals 𝑉� . The second step is to run the probit model of
equation (1) that includes the residuals obtained from step 1. The probability that 𝑌 is equal to

one is given by

𝑝𝑟(𝑌 = 1|𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑊, 𝑉) = 𝛷[(𝑋1 𝛿1 + 𝑋2 𝛿2 + 𝑊𝜆 + 𝜃𝑉)⁄(1 − 𝜌12 )1⁄2 ]

Under joint normality of (𝑈, 𝑉), with Var(𝑈)= 1, and Var(𝑉) = 𝜏22
𝑈 = 𝜃𝑉 + 𝑒,
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(14)

where 𝜃 =

𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑉,𝑈)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑉)

, and 𝑒 is independent of 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 and 𝑊. Hence,
𝑒|𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑊, 𝑉 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1 − 𝜌12 )

The model presented consistently estimates 𝜹⁄(1 − 𝜌12 )1⁄2. 𝜌1 is the correlation

coefficient between 𝑈 and 𝑉. However, while Rivers and Vuong (1988) yield consistent

estimates, Woodridge (2010) argues that another approach, the Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) has some added advantages over Rivers and Vuong estimator. MLE is more efficient and
also yields direct estimates, allowing direct computation of marginal effects. The probability that
𝑌 is equal to one is given by

(𝑋1 𝛿1 + 𝑋2 𝛿2 + 𝜃(𝑋2 − 𝑋1 𝛿1 + 𝑋2 𝛿2 + 𝑊𝜆)
𝑝𝑟(𝑌 = 1|𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑊, 𝑉) = 𝛷 �
�
(1 − 𝜌12 )1⁄2

(15)

Regardless of the approach used, researchers may encounter two important problems in

the search for instruments. The first one is the weak instrument problem where there is low
correlation between excluded instruments and the endogenous variables. Using weak
instruments produces estimates with large standard errors. Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) draw
attention to two other problems associated with weak instruments. First, when instruments are
weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, even a weak correlation between
the instruments and the error in the original equation can lead to a large inconsistency in IV
instruments. Second, in finite samples, IV estimates are biased in the same direction as OLS
estimates, with the magnitude of the bias approaching that of the OLS as the R2 between the
instruments and the exogenous variables and the endogenous explanatory variable approaching
0. The second one is the many instruments problem where there is a large number of
overidentifying restrictions. Newey, Hansen and Hausman (2004) argue that one way of dealing
with the many instruments problem is by leaving some out since the number of instruments is the
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researcher’s choice. Another solution offered by Newey, Hansen and Hausman (2004) is the use
of the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) or Fuller (1977) (FULL) estimators with
the Bekker (1994) standard error (BSE). Mourine (1983) and Bekker (1994) show that under
normality LIML is still approximately normal with many instruments, and the BSE adjust to
excess dispersion. Newey, Hansen and Hausman find that BSE does not fix the weak instrument
problem and that using all the instruments is more informative than just using a few.
Since the dependent variable in this study is categorical, the appropriate endogeneity test
is the Wald test for exogeneity. In order for turnout to statistically pass as endogenous, two
conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, the coefficient estimate of the instrument in equation 2 must
be significant. Secondly, the chi 2 for the exogeneity test must be significant. Turnout is
instrumented by a country’s voting system laws. Voting system is an index measuring the degree
of compulsory voting. Payne, Zovatto, Carillo and Allamand (2003) propose a 4-point scale of
compulsory voting instead of the traditional binary variable measure of the laws. Countries with
voluntary voting are scored as 0, countries that have a compulsory voting mandate but no
sanctions against nonvoters written into law are scored as 1, compulsory systems possessing such
legal sanctions but leaving them generally unenforced are scored as 2, and compulsory systems
with legal sanctions that are enforced in practice are given the highest value of 3. A higher index
is associated with a higher turnout.

4.1.

ESTIMATION APPROACHES

4.1.1

PROBIT MODEL
Table 2 provides the results for probit estimation method. Models 1 and 2 include the

number of radios per 1000 of population to capture the quantity of information that is
disseminated to voters. In Model 2, the number of radios per 1000 is interacted with corruption.
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The interaction ensures that information on corruption aired on the radios is controlled for.
Table 2: Probit Estimation (Dependent Variable=Reelection)
(1)
Turnout
∆ in corruption
Electoral fraud
Democracy
∆ in GDP per capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radios per 1000 pop.

Coeff.
-0.034*
(0.019)
0.303
(0.331)
-0.744
(0.658)
-0.073
(0.085)
0.001
(0.001)
0.218***
(0.080)
1.922***
(0.639)
2.125**
(0.875)
0.004**
(0.002)

Radio* ∆ in corruption

AME
-0.006**
(0.003)
0.051
(0.054)
-0.124
(0.105)
-0.012
(0.015)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.036***
(0.011)
0.321***
(0.081)
0.355***
(0.111)
0.0007***
(0.0002)

(2)
Coeff.
-0.029
(0.019)
-0.889
(0.755)
-0.892
(0.645)
-0.079
(0.104)
0.001
(0.001)
0.262**
(0.111)
1.892***
(0.624)
2.284**
(0.900)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)

Press freedom
Press freedom*∆ in
corruption
Wald chi2 (k+1)
26.85
n=48
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
k=number of independent variables
AME=Average Marginal Effects

23.23

(3)
AME
-0.005*
(0.003)

-0.143
(0.099)
-0.013
(0.017)
0.0001
(0.002)
0.042***
(0.015)
0.304***
(0.077)
0.367***
(0.105)

(4)

Coeff.
0.005
(0.016)
0.616
(0.424)
-0.486
(0.498)
0.077
(0.115)
0.001
(0.001)
0.174**
(0.085)
1.449**
(0.565)
1.475**
(0.637)

AME
0.001
(0.003)
0.122
(0.085)
-0.096
(0.099)
0.015
(0.022)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.034**
(0.014)
0.287***
(0.096)
0.292***
(0.108)

Coeff.
0.018
(0.018)
-2.896*
(1.545)
-0.785
(0.617)
0.135
(0.145)
0.001
(0.001)
0.155*
(0.085)
1.621***
(0.624)
1.777**
(0.722)

-0.037
(0.023)

-0.007*
(0.004)

-0.05**
(0.026)

24.57

AME
0.003
(0.003)

-0.136
(0.107)
0.023
(0.024)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.027**
(0.013)
0.281***
(0.091)
0.308***
(0.105)

0.067**
(0.031)
23.14

In Models 3 and 4, the freedom of press index is used to capture the quality of
information that the voters are exposed to. A free media allows for information to be relayed to
the voters without fear of persecution. Just like Model 2, Model 4 introduces an interaction term
between the freedom of press index and corruption. Also included in Table 2 are the marginal
effects of the variables that are not interacted. Not included in Table 2 are the marginal effects of
corruption and the information variables, which are interacted and require a separate calculation.
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These are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The nonlinearity introduced by the interaction terms
requires the use of a Stata command predictnl, and, since there are three categorical independent
variables, the marginal effects are calculated for each of the possible values of the three
categorical variables. In Models 1 and 3, there is no evidence that in developing countries
corruption affects the reelection chances of an incumbent party’s presidential candidate. In
Model 1, one can argue that in developing countries, the programs that are broadcast on radio
stations do not expose corruption and its impact on the well being of the voters. In countries
where governments have substantial amount of control of public radio stations, radios can be
used as a propaganda tool for the incumbent party. Even in countries with private radio stations,
there is a possibility that broadcasting licenses are issued to those that are sympathetic with the
incumbent party. A positive and significant coefficient on radio supports to the reasoning that
information disseminated through the radios enhances the reelection chances of an incumbent
0.07 percent.
The control variables electoral fraud, democracy, and change in GDP per capita are
insignificant not only in Model 1, but in all the models. Turnout is significant in Models 1 and 2,
where the information variable used is the number of radios per 1000 of the population. The
reelection chances of an incumbent party’s presidential candidate are reduced by about 0.5% for
every 1% increase in voter turnout. This may explain why incumbent parties may employ tactics
to discourage voter turnout, especially in opposition strongholds. In Zimbabwe, in 2006, for
example, it was alleged that the war veterans, who are supporters of the incumbent, were
intimidating voters in opposition strongholds. When information is controlled for by the freedom
of press index (Models 3 and 4), turnout is no longer significant. The joint significance test
between freedom of press and turnout yields a chi 2 equal to 3.18, which is insignificant. Three
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control variables, namely number of challengers, same candidate, and region, are significant in
Model 1. Notice also that the same three variables are significant in all four models reported in
Table 2. If one more candidate decides to run for the presidency, the reelection chances of the
incumbent party’s presidential candidate increase by about 3 percent to 4 percent. It seems the
extra candidate splits the opposition vote, allowing the incumbent party’s presidential candidate
an easier path to victory. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ruling party can use this as a
strategy to retain power by sponsoring smaller parties in the opposition strongholds in order to
increase the chances of winning reelection. Such parties usually disband or end up joining the
ruling party after the elections.
Fielding a sitting president is advantageous for the incumbent party. The results show that
the likelihood of an incumbent party winning reelection is 30 percent higher if the incumbent
party fields a sitting president compared to when the party changes its presidential candidate.
Holding everything else constant, a sitting president is already well known and therefore easier
to sell than a different candidate. This may explain why after serving the maximum number of
terms allowed for by the constitution, some ruling parties try to manipulate the constitution to
allow the same candidate to run for office. In Zambia in 2002, for example, the incumbent
president tried to change the constitution to run for a third term but failed. Similarly, in Malawi
in 2004, the incumbent party made two attempts to manipulate the constitution to allow for an
open term and then to a third term but failed in both cases. As for the comparison between
developing countries in Africa and those in the Americas, holding everything constant,
incumbent presidents in Africa are about 30% more likely to get reelected than those in South
and Central Americas.
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In Models 2 and 4 interaction terms, are introduced to test the response of the voters
when radios disseminate information on corruption (Model 2) and when the media personnel can
freely expose corruption without fear of persecution (Model 4). Table 3 shows the marginal
effects of corruption and Table 4 shows the marginal effects of the information variables. Recall
that there are three dummy variables that have to be accounted for.
Table 3: Marginal Effects of Change in Corruption for PROBIT Models
Region=1

Region=0

Fraud=1

Same
candidate = 1
Same
candidate= 0

Fraud=0

Fraud=1

Fraud=0

(2)

(4)

(2)

(4)

(2)

(4)

(2)

(4)

0.0011

0.0614

0.0001

0.0113

0.0227

0.2903

0.0129

0.2159

(0.0071)

(0.0849)

(0.0006)

(0.0148)

(0.1444)

(0.1870)

(0.0803)

(0.1718)

0.0195

0.2875

0.0078

0.1891

0.0054

0.0762

0.0167

0.2022

(0.1256)

(0.1885)

(0.0515)

(0.1399)

(0.0376)

(0.0902)

(0.1085)

(0.1292)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3 shows that corruption has no effect on the reelection chances of incumbent
parties, even after interacting the corruption variable with the information variables (number of
radios and freedom of press).
Table 4: Marginal Effects of the Information Variables for PROBIT Models with Interaction Terms
Region=1
Fraud=1
(2)
Same
candidate = 1
Same
candidate= 0

(4)

Region=0
Fraud=0
(2)

Fraud=1
(4)

(2)

Fraud=0

(4)
**

-0.023

**

(2)

(4)

0.0009

-0.0172

0.0001

-0.0049

0.00001

-0.0009

0.0015

(0.0001)

(0.0066)

(0.00019)

(0.0011)

(0.0008)

(0.0107)

(0.0007)

(0.0122)

0.0013*

-0.022**

0.0005

-0.015**

0.0004

-0.0061

0.0011***

-0.016**

(0.0008)

(0.0107)

(0.0004)

(0.0075)

(0.0005)

(0.0062)

(0.0004)

(0.0072)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in Table 4 show that in Africa (region=1) when the incumbent party fields the
sitting president (same candidate=1) and the elections are declared fraudulent (fraud=1),
exposing corruption has no effect on the election outcome. However, when the incumbent party
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changes the candidate (same candidate=0), information on corruption has a significant effect on
election outcome. When radio is interacted with corruption (Model 2), the marginal effect of
radios is 0.0013. This may seem like a surprising result because the expectation is that when
corruption is exposed, the voters should punish the incumbent party. However, this variable may
be capturing the extent to which the incumbent party can go to exert pressure on the radio
stations to manipulate the information to its advantage. One possible way the incumbent party
can do this is to stop government agencies from advertising on the radio stations that broadcast
information against it. When the press is free to expose corruption, the information variable has a
significant and negative effect on the reelection chances of the incumbent party’s presidential
candidate. The chances are reduced by about 2.3 percent. For a nonfraudulent election in Africa,
with the same candidate for the incumbent party, information on corruption has no effect on
election outcomes. When the incumbent fields a different, candidate radio has no effect but
freedom of press does affect the incumbent party’s presidential candidate negatively. The
probability of winning an election is reduced by about 1.5 percent.
In summary, in Africa, information on corruption does not change the reelection chances
of an incumbent party’s presidential candidate when the incumbent party fields a sitting
president. In eighteen African elections in the sample for which a sitting candidate runs for
reelection, the incumbent party wins in all of them. When the candidate is changed, the
incumbent party’s chances of reelection are reduced when the media is free to expose corruption.
Unlike Africa, in South and Central Americas, information on corruption does have an
effect on election outcome when an incumbent party fields the same candidate depending on
whether or not an election is fraudulent. For a fraudulent election, radio increases the
incumbent’s probability of winning by about 0.15 percent. Freedom of press reduces the
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probability by about 2.3 percent. For a nonfraudulent election in South and Central Americas,
information on corruption does not have any effect on the reelection chances, just like in Africa.
If the incumbent party fields a different candidate in South and Central Americas and there is
fraud, information on corruption does not affect the outcome of an election. For a different
candidate, both radio and freedom of press have a significant effect. Information on corruption
on radios increases the probability of winning reelection by 0.11 percent while the media’s
freedom to expose corruption reduces the chances by about 1.6 percent. Notice that for Africa
only freedom of press matters in this case.
In summary, for probit estimation, when the media is free to expose corrupt practices
without fear of being persecuted, information on corruption affects the incumbent party
negatively. The variable number of radios per 1000 of the population has a positive sign, which
implies that radios are beneficial to the incumbent party. Notice that this variable may be
capturing corruption at the broadcasting houses that favor the incumbent party. For Africa,
information on corruption matters only when the incumbent party changes its candidate while for
South and Central Americas it depends also on whether or not the election is declared free or
fair.
Table 5 gives the marginal effects when both corruption and information variables
change. The calculations are based on Ai and Norton (2004) who argue that in nonlinear models
the marginal effect of the interaction term is not equal to the marginal effect of changing just the
interaction term. 22 For a derivation of the marginal effects of the interaction term in this study,
see Appendix B.

22

For a probit model, Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) calculates the marginal effects of interaction terms as:
𝜕 2 𝐹(𝑢)
= {𝛽12 − (𝛽1 + 𝛽12 𝑥2 )(𝛽2 + 𝛽12 𝑥1 )𝑢}∅(𝑢)
𝜕𝑥1 𝜕𝑥2
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Table 5: Interaction Effects of Corruption and Information Variables for PROBIT Models
Region=1

Region=0

Fraud=1
(2)
Same
candidate = 1
Same
candidate= 0

(4)

Fraud=0
(2)

Fraud=1
(4)

(2)

(4)

Fraud=0
(2)

(4)

0.0001

-0.0164

0.00001

-0.0025

0.0018

-0.0473

0.0010

-0.0253

(0.0002)

(0.0235)

(0.0009)

(0.0025)

(0.0012)

(0.0344)

(0.0007)

(0.0170)

0.0016

-0.0494

0.0001

-0.0239*

0.0004

-0.0052

0.0011**

-0.0047

(0.0013)

(0.0417)

(0.0005)

(0.0139)

(0.0006)

(0.0062)

(0.0006)

(0.0120)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in Table 5 show that the interaction between corruption and information
variables has no effect on the reelection chances when an incumbent party fields the same
presidential candidate as in the previous election. When a different candidate is fielded, the
interaction between corruption and freedom of press has a negative effect on reelection chances
of the incumbent party’s presidential candidate in Africa. For Central and South Americas, it is
the interaction between corruption and radio that is significant.

4.1.1

INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE PROBIT
In the probit estimation, all the explanatory variables are treated as exogenous. If one the

explanatory variables is endogenous, failure to account for the endogeneity yields biased and
inconsistent estimates of the causal effect of an explanatory variable on an outcome. The
appropriate estimation approach when an explanatory variable is endogenous is the instrumental
variable probit. The argument for the endogeneity of voter turnout is put forward by Hansford
and Gomez (2010). They argue that individual preferences of a candidate affect both voter
turnout and election outcome and that closeness of an election increases the probability that an
individual vote can be decisive in determining the outcome and hence affecting both election
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outcome and voter turnout. In addition, one can argue that errors by the Electoral Management
Bodies, whether deliberate or due to incompetence, affect both turnout and election outcome.
The endogenous variable voter turnout is instrumented by compulsory voting laws. Table
6 provides the results of treating voter turnout as an endogenous variable.
Table 6: IVPROBIT Estimation

Turnout
∆ in corruption
Electoral fraud
Democracy
∆ in GDP per capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radios
Radio*∆ in
corruption

(5)
Reelection
-0.081***
(0.014)
-0.119
(0.331)
-0.512
(0.380)
-0.053
(0.061)
0.001
(0.001)
0.129*
(0.069)
1.337**
(0.618)
1.436*
(0.804)
0.005***
(0.001)

Turnout

-3.445
(3.363)
1.381
(4.379)
-0.055
(0.771)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.203
(0.294)
1.673
(4.956)
9.651
(6.313)
0.017*
(0.009)

(6)
Reelection
-0.085***
(0.011)
-1.114
(0.807)
-0.463
(0.313)
-0.046
(0.061)
0.001
(0.001)
0.110*
(0.065)
1.056**
(0.506)
1.103*
(0.653)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.003
(0.002)

Turnout

-2.979
(7.784)
1.436
(4.302)
-0.066
(0.811)
0.008*
(0.004)
0.203
(0.295)
1.683
(4.947)
9.625
(6.298)
0.018*
(0.010)

-0.026
(0.041)

Press freedom*∆ in
corruption
6.849**
(2.741)

Wald chi2 (k+1)
46.150***
Wald test of
exogeneity
Chi2(1)
4.900**
n=48
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-4.421
(2.918)
4.646
(3.814)
-0.861
(0.731)
0.007
(0.004)
0.272
(0.237)
2.224
(4.861)
4.371
(5.490)

(8)
Reelection
0.005
(0.065)
-2.641
(2.128)
-0.708
(0.652)
0.112
(0.206)
0.001
(0.001)
0.155*
(0.087)
1.639***
(0.617)
1.644
(1.209)

0.381**
(0.169)

-0.045
(0.053)

0.386**
(0.164)

0.061
(0.046)

-0.202
(0.127)

Turnout

Turnout

7.343
(8.030)
5.023
(3.666)
-1.113
(0.743)
0.008*
(0.005)
0.287
(0.237)
1.858
(4.874)
3.135
(5.432)

-0.001
(0.014)

Freedom of press

Compulsory voting
laws

(7)
Reelection
-0.012
(0.050)
0.529
(0.487)
-0.416
(0.476)
0.052
(0.144)
0.001
(0.001)
0.170*
(0.089)
1.479***
(0.551)
1.312
(0.938)

6.841**
(2.767)

7.381***
(2.067)

6.812***
(2.021)

72.920***

27.710***

26.430***

10.430***

0.160

0.060
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Using the Wald test of exogeneity, there is evidence to confirm that voter turnout is
endogenous only in models that include the number of radios per 1000 population as the
information variable (Models 5 and 6) but not models which use the press freedom index
(Models 7 and 8). Notice that Table 6 also reports the first stage regression of turnout on the
instrumental variable (compulsory voting laws) and all the other explanatory variables.
Compulsory voting is significant and has the right sign, an indication that it is a good instrument
for voter turnout.
Table 7 reports the marginal effects of the uninteracted terms. Only marginal effects for
Models 5 and 6 are reported since in Models 7 and 8, turnout does not pass the test of
endogeneity. Thus, for models that include press freedom, the best approach is the probit model.
Table 7: Marginal Effects of the Uninteracted Terms
(5)
-0.018***
(0.005)
-0.026
(0.075)
-0.113
(0.084)
-0.012
(0.013)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.028***
(0.010)
0.295***
(0.088)
0.317***
(0.121)
0.0010***
(0.0002)

Turnout
Change in corruption
Electoral fraud
Democracy
Change in GDP per capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radio per 1000 pop.

(6)
-0.019***
(0.004)

-0.010
(0.073)
-0.011
(0.014)
0.0002*
(0.0001)
0.025*
(0.011)
0.244***
(0.087)
0.255***
(0.120)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Two tail test conducted for turnout, corruption and region
only

Not included in Model 6 in Table 7 are the marginal effects of the interacted terms. These
are reported in Table 8, and, just like in the probit approach, there are eight possible
combinations of the dummy variables (fraud, same candidate, and region).
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The results from Table 7 show that even after accounting for the endogeneity of voter
turnout, corruption is still insignificant. Turnout becomes more significant. In Model 5 a 1
percent increase in voter turnout decreases the reelection chances of the incumbent party’s
presidential candidate by 1.8 percent, while in Model 6 the chances are reduced by 1.9 percent.
This is just over three times more than probit estimates. Electoral fraud and level of democracy
remain insignificant in both models. Change in GDP per capita becomes significant. An increase
in GDP per capita is associated with a 0.02 percent increase in reelection chances. Just like in the
probit estimation the number of challengers, same candidate and region have a significant effect
on the reelection chances. An increase by 1 in the number of challengers increases the reelection
chances of the incumbent party’s candidate by about three percent. Compared with the probit
estimation this is about a 1 percent drop. Fielding the same candidate increases the chances by
about 20 percent and 25 percent for Models 5 and 6, respectively. This is also lower than the 32
percent and 30 percent for the probit estimation. In Model 5, incumbent party candidates in
Africa are 32 percent more likely to be reelected than in South and Central Americas and 26
percent more likely in Model 6. In Table 7, the marginal effects of corruption and number of
radios are not included because the two variables are interacted with each other and the
calculations for the marginal effects take into account the 3 dummy variables (same candidate,
fraud and region) that are included in the model. Therefore, Table 8 and Table 9 provide the
marginal effects of corruption and information variables.
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Table 8: Marginal Effects of Corruption for IVPROBIT Models with Interaction Terms for Model 6
Region=1

Same candidate = 1

Same candidate = 0

Region=0

Fraud=1

Fraud=0

Fraud=1

Fraud=0

-0.0191

0.0001

-0.0378

-0.0329

(0.0728)

(0.0006)

(0.1350)

(0.1180)

-0.0376

0.0078

-0.0232

-0.0330

(0.1353)

(0.0515)

(0.0850)

(0.1176)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8 shows that corruption has no effect on election outcomes even after accounting
for the endogeneity of voter turnout. Table 9 provides the marginal effect of the number of radios
per 1000 of population when interacted with corruption.
Table 9: Marginal Effects of Information Variables for IVPROBIT Models with Interaction Terms for
Model 6
Region=1
Fraud=1
Same candidate = 1

Same candidate = 0

Region=0
Fraud=0

Fraud=1
0.0017

Fraud=0
***

0.0014***

0.0008

0.0004

(0.0005)

(0.0005)

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

0.0017***

0.0014***

0.001**

0.0014***

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

(0.0003)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results show that in Africa, information on corruption affects the reelection chances
of the incumbent party’s presidential candidate only when there is a change in the presidential
candidate by the ruling party. When an election is not free and fair in Africa, the probability that
the new candidate fielded by the incumbent wins an election is increased by 0.17 percent
compared to 0.14 percent when free and fair. For South and Central Americas, information on
corruption is significant regardless of whether or not the incumbent party changes its candidate
and regardless of whether or not the election is free and fair. Notice that an interaction of
corruption with the number of radios per 1000 population seems to suggest that information on
corruption boosts the reelection chances of the incumbent party’s presidential candidate.
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However, as already explained, this variable may be capturing the corruption that exists at the
radio stations. In the probit model, it was established that an interaction with the freedom press
index actually shows a decrease in the election chances of the incumbent party’s presidential
candidate. In conclusion, the media needs to be free to disseminate information on corruption if
voters are to respond in an expected way, such as voting against the incumbent.
In order to assess whether or not voters punish corrupt politicians, other studies have
investigated the effect of corruption on the change in the share of votes won by the incumbent
party’s candidate (Krause and Mendez, 2007). Table 10 provides the results of the regression of
the change in the share of votes on the same independent variables as the ones used when the
independent variable is reelection. Just like in the probability approach, turnout is initially treated
as exogenous, hence the estimation method used is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Turnout is
then treated as an endogenous variable, necessitating the use of Instrumental Variable Regression
(IVREG).
Table 10: Estimations with Change in Vote Share of the Incumbent Party's Candidate as the Dependent
Variable

Change in corruption
# of radios per 1000 pop.

(9)
-1.626
(6.892)
0.033
(0.022)

Radio*corruption
Press freedom

OLS
(10)
(11)
-5.588
0.718
(13.960) (7.028)
0.033
(0.022)
0.010
(0.030)
-0.488
(0.354)

Press
freedom*corruption
F-statistic
R-squared

1.530
0.272

1.360
0.274

(12)
-28.624
(26.724)

-0.512
(0.353)
0.510
(0.448)
1.460
0.288

1.460
0.263

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
n=47
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(13)
-4.479
(8.546)
0.066*
(0.037)

1.220

IVREG
(14)
(15)
-7.791
-0.789
(16.763) (7.600)
0.066*
(0.037)
0.008
(0.036)
-0.282
(0.485)

1.080

1.420

(16)
-23.424
(29.502)

-0.351
(0.504)
0.400
(0.516)
1.410

Table 10 reports the results for only corruption, the information variables and their
interactions. The full results are shown in Tables 14 and 15 in Appendix B. Notice that using the
same independent variables for the probit and the IVprobit estimations yields insignificant
estimates for the change in corruption. Furthermore, the F-tests for the significance of the overall
model show that the independent variables together do not explain the change in the share of
votes. Thus using the change in the share of votes as the dependent variable may require a
different set of variables.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION
The study sets out to investigate the reelection chances of incumbent parties in
developing countries in the midst of public corruption. The main hypothesis tested in this study
is that voters punish corrupt incumbent parties by voting them out of power. This hypothesis
hinges on the assumption that public corruption has a negative effect on the well being of the
citizens.
In line with this vast empirical evidence that corruption is bad, the study hypothesizes
that voters should punish an incumbent party if it is perceived to be corrupt. Studies consistently
show that voters withdraw their support for corrupt public officials as evidenced by the decrease
in the share of votes garnered by the officials accused of corruption (Krause and Mendez, 2007;
Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Peters and Welch, 1980; Reed, 1999).

However, the studies are

inconclusive with regards to the extent with which the drop in the share of votes will result in the
loss of an election for the incumbent party. This study finds some evidence that the reelection
chances of an incumbent party’s presidential candidates in developing countries are reduced
when voters are informed about the corrupt activities of an incumbent party. The study
establishes that when voters are not informed, corruption does not influence the reelection
chances of the incumbent party’s presidential candidate. This argument is tested in the study by
the inclusion of information variables namely: (1) number of radios per 1000 of population to
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measure the quantity of information; (2) freedom of press to capture the quality of information
being relayed to the voters; and (3) in order to ensure the level of corruption information being
disseminated to the voters, interactions between corruption and the information variables are
included. The results show some evidence that when the media is free to expose corruption the
reelection chances are reduced. Radio broadcast does not seem to be an effective way of
exposing corruption in developing countries. This may be due to the huge influence the
government may have on radio stations, directly or indirectly.
Another reason tested in this study as to why corrupt officials get reelected tested is that
the incumbent parties in developing countries engage in electoral fraud with the assistance of
Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs). This is not a farfetched possibility considering that in
some countries the appointments to these bodies are not as apolitical as they are portrayed to be.
In addition there have been several cases where the elections have been disputed by the
opposition claiming that the election results were doctored by the EMB to favor the incumbent
party president. The Kenyan elections of 2007 and 2012 were both disputed for alleged fraud. A
fraud variable is included to control for the possibility of fraud and the results show that fraud
does not have any significant effect on the electoral outcomes in developing countries. The
measure of fraud used in this study is the World Bank political indicator that defines whether or
not an election is free or fair. In the absence of an objective cross country measure of fraud this
suffices but it will be interesting to see the results when a better measure is created. Country
specific studies that have investigated electoral fraud have found that electoral fraud influences
electoral outcomes.
This study finds that electoral fraud does not influence the election outcomes.
Considering that huge sums of financial resources are lost in the litigation process, and in some
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cases lives are lost when the losers do not accept election outcomes, the result may seem to
suggest that it is irrational to challenge the results. Electoral fraud and elections outcome is a
relationship that needs to be explored further.
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Table 11: Data Sources
Variable

Source

Reelection

African Elections Database, Psephos: Adam Carr's
Election Archives, Center on Democratic Performance
and Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Corruption

Transparency international and World bank

Fraud

World Bank

Turnout

African Elections Database, Psephos: Adam Carr's
Election Archives, Center on Democratic Performance
and Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Democracy

World Resources Institute

Real per capita GDP

Computed from Real GDP data from World Bank

# of challengers

Psephos: Adam Carr’s Election Archives

# of radios per 1000

World Resources Institute

Voting System

Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics by Region

Mean

Africa
Std.
Dev.
Min

Max

South and Central America
Std.
Mean
Dev.
Min
Max

All

Reelection

0.75

0.44

0.00

1.00

0.43

0.50

0.00

1.00

0.60

0.49

0.00

1.00

Corruption

7.11

0.78

4.70

8.60

6.88

1.29

2.70

8.50

7.00

1.06

2.70

8.60

Electoral fraud

0.46

0.50

0.00

1.00

0.11

0.32

0.00

1.00

0.29

0.46

0.00

1.00

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max
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Level of democracy

2.63

4.66

-6.00

8.00

7.75

1.95

-2.00

10.00

5.08

4.43

-6.00

10.00

Turnout
Change in GDP per
capita

62.34

15.58

28.41

93.80

68.37

14.49

38.57

94.55

65.23

15.29

28.41

94.55

29.88

147.18

-785.7

333.08

186.32

340.65

-906.3

991.62

104.70

268.69

-906.3

991.62

# of challengers
# of radios per 1000
pop.

4.52

3.60

1.00

17.00

5.73

6.17

1.00

34.00

5.10

5.01

1.00

34.00

170.00

73.89

44.00

386.00

380.02

230.21

19.00

793.00

270.45

197.46

19.00

793.00

Freedom of press

46.48

16.60

17.00

77.00

56.93

13.29

32.00

84.00

51.48

15.92

17.00

84.00
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Country

Electoral System
for Presidents

Algeria

Two-round system

Argentina

Two-round system

Benin

Two-round system

Table 13: List of Countries and their Electoral Systems
Electoral System
Maximum number of terms
Country
for Presidents
Two five-year terms
changed to unlimited terms
Kenya
Two-round system
in 2008
Two consecutive four-year
Malawi
First past the post
terms
Two five-year terms
Mali
Two-round system

Bolivia

Two-round system

Two five-year terms

Mauritania

Two-round system

Two five-year terms

Cameroon
Central African
Republic

First past the post

Two five-year terms

Mexico

First past the post

One six-year term

Two-round system

Two five-year terms

Mozambique

Two-round system

Two five-year terms

Chile

Two-round system

Namibia

Two-round system

Two five-year terms

Colombia

Two-round system

Nicaragua

Two-round system

Two five-year terms

Costa Rica

Two-round system

Niger

Two-round system

Two five-year terms

Cote d'Ivoire
Dominican
Republic

Two-round system

Unlimited non-consecutive
four-year terms
Two four-year terms
Unlimited non-consecutive
four-year terms
Two five-year terms

Panama

First past the post

Two non-consecutive five-year terms

Two-round system

Two four-year terms

Paraguay

First past the post

One five-year term

Ecuador

Two-round system

Two four-year terms

Peru

Two-round system

El Salvador

Two-round system

Two four-year terms

Senegal

Two-round system

Unlimited non-consecutive five-year
terms
Two seven-year terms

Gabon

First past the post

Unlimited seven-year terms

Sierra Leone

Two-round system

Two five-year terms

Gambia

Two-round system

Unlimited five year terms

Tanzania

First past the post

Ghana

Two-round system

Two four-year terms

Uganda

First past the post

Guatemala

Two-round system

One four-year term

Uruguay

Two-round system

Two five-year terms
Two five-year terms amended to
unlimited five-year terms
Unlimited non-consecutive five-year
terms

Haiti

Two-round system

Two non-consecutive five
year terms

Zambia

First past the post

Two five-year terms

Honduras

First past the post

One four-year term

Zimbabwe

First past the post

Unlimited five-year terms amended to
two five year terms in 2013

Maximum number of terms
Two five-year terms
Two five-year terms
Two five-year terms
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Derivation
𝒀∗ = 𝑿𝜷 + 𝜶𝐖 + 𝜺
𝚼 = 𝒁𝚷 + 𝒖

𝑾 = 𝑰(𝒀∗ > 0)

𝒀∗ = 𝑿𝜷 + 𝜶𝒁𝚷 + 𝜺 + 𝜶[𝐖 − 𝑬(𝐖|𝐗)]

We are interested in finding the conditional probability of Y|W
Letting v= 𝜺 + 𝜶[𝐖 − 𝑬(𝐖|𝐗)]

𝒗 ∼ 𝑵(𝟎, 𝟏 + 𝜶𝟐 𝝈𝟐𝒖 + 𝟐𝜶𝑪𝒐𝒗(𝜺, 𝒖)

𝑾 ∼ 𝑵(𝒁𝚷, 𝝈𝟐𝒖 )

𝒇(𝒗|𝑾)

𝝆𝟐 (𝑾 − 𝒁𝚷)𝟐�
𝟏�
= 𝟏�
𝒆𝒙𝒑(−
[
𝟐
𝟐(𝟏 − 𝝆 )
𝝈𝟐𝒖
�𝟐𝝅(𝟏 − 𝝆𝟐 )�𝟏 + 𝜶𝟐 𝝈𝟐𝒖 + 𝟐𝜶𝑪𝒐𝒗(𝜺, 𝒖)
𝟐

+𝒗 �
−
𝟏 + 𝜶𝟐 𝝈𝟐𝒖 + 𝟐𝜶𝑪𝒐𝒗(𝜺, 𝒖)

𝟐𝝆𝒗(𝑾 − 𝒁𝚷)� �
𝟐 𝟐
𝝈𝒖 𝟏 + 𝜶 𝝈𝒖 + 𝟐𝜶𝑪𝒐𝒗(𝜺, 𝒖)

This enables us to find the distribution of Y|W which is then used to compute the marginal
effects of interaction terms based on Norton and Ai (2004)
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Table 14: OLS for Change in Vote Share of the Incumbent Party's Candidate

Turnout
Change in corruption
Electoral fraud
Level of democracy
Change in GDP per capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radios per 1000 pop.

(1)
-0.327
(0.277)
-1.626
(6.892)
-12.884
(9.845)
-2.098
(1.568)
-0.001
(0.013)
-0.244
(0.667)
17.570**
(8.568)
4.662
(10.338)
0.033
(0.022)

Radio*corruption

(2)
-0.326
(0.280)
-5.588
(13.960)
-13.357
(10.070)
-2.000
(1.615)
-0.002
(0.013)
-0.246
(0.676)
17.530*
(8.674)
4.800
(10.473)
0.033
(0.022)
0.010
(0.030)

Press freedom

(3)
-0.008
(0.280)
0.718
(7.028)
-18.598*
(10.456)
-0.705
(1.787)
-0.004
(0.013)
-0.615
(0.675)
17.582**
(8.624)
2.470
(10.024)

(4)
0.063
(0.286)
-28.624
(26.724)
-19.938*
(10.481)
-0.045
(1.872)
-0.008
(0.013)
-0.691
(0.675)
18.677**
(8.644)
3.813
(10.054)

-0.488
(0.354)

-0.512
(0.353)
0.510
(0.448)
1.460
0.288

Press freedom*corruption
F-statistic
1.530
R-squared
0.272
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1.360
0.274
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1.460
0.263

Table 15: IVREG for Change in Vote Share of the Incumbent Party's Candidate
Turnout
Change in corruption
Electoral fraud
Democracy
Change in GDP per capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radios per 1000 pop.

(7)
-1.430
(0.935)
-4.479
(8.546)
-12.584
(11.776)
-2.215
(1.878)
0.003
(0.016)
-0.152
(0.801)
21.712*
(10.760)
7.047
(12.507)
0.066*
(0.037)

Radio*change in corruption

(8)
-1.422
(0.946)
-7.791
(16.763)
-12.984
(12.028)
-2.132
(1.932)
0.003
(0.016)
-0.155
(0.810)
21.650*
(10.878)
7.146
(12.648)
0.066*
(0.037)
0.008
(0.036)

Press freedom

(9)
-0.414
(0.697)
-0.789
(7.600)
-16.878
(11.080)
-1.161
(1.971)
-0.004
(0.013)
-0.569
(0.697)
19.662**
(9.443)
-0.471
(11.286)

(10)
-0.259
(0.767)
-23.424
(29.502)
-18.347
(11.224)
-0.533
(2.187)
-0.007
(0.013)
-0.640
(0.697)
20.014**
(9.274)
1.298
(11.632)

-0.282
(0.485)

-0.351
(0.504)
0.400
(0.516)
1.410

Press freedom*change in corruption
F-statistic

1.220

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
n=47
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1.080

1.420

APPENDIX D: CORRUPTION MEASURED IN LEVELS

77

The empirical analysis in the main body understandably uses the change in the CPI on the
understanding that one can attribute that change to the incumbent party. The drawback is that the
number of observations is reduced to 48. In this appendix the level of corruption is used instead.
Not only does this increase the sample size, but also allows for more variation in the data. It also
allows for an assessment of whether voters care for the level of or the change in corruption.

C1. PROBIT MODEL
Table 16 shows the probit results when the level of corruption is used instead of the change.
Table 16: Probit estimation with Corruption Measured in Levels
(1)
Turnout
Corruption
Electoral fraud
Democracy
Change in GDP per
capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radios per 1000 pop.

(2)

(3)

Coeff
-0.001
(0.013)
-0.192
(0.230)
0.135
(0.654)
-0.331*
(0.198)

AME
-0.0003
(0.0032)
-0.046
(0.053)
0.032
(0.158)
-0.080**
(0.044)

Coeff
-0.001
(0.015)
0.800*
(0.437)
-0.054
(0.852)
-0.389*
(0.199)

AME
-0.0001
(0.0030)

0.0004
(0.0006)
0.119**
(0.052)
0.921**
(0.414)
0.728
(0.562)
0.002
(0.001)

0.0001
(0.0002)
0.029**
(0.011)
0.222**
(0.094)
0.175
(0.132)
0.0004
(0.0003)

0.0005
(0.0007)
0.195***
(0.061)
1.323***
(0.428)
0.919
(0.618)
0.015**
(0.006)
-0.002**
(0.001)

Radio*corruption
Press freedom

(4)
AME
0.002
(0.003)
-0.080
(0.052)
-0.004
(0.154)
-0.059
(0.047)

Coeff
0.009
(0.014)
-0.213
(1.101)
-0.022
(0.632)
-0.243
(0.204)

AME
0.002
(0.003)

-0.012
(0.181)
-0.083
(0.039)

Coeff
0.009
(0.013)
-0.323
(0.223)
-0.016
(0.621)
-0.236
(0.197)

0.0001
(0.0002)
0.041**
(0.011)
0.281**
(0.085)
0.196
(0.126)

0.000
(0.001)
0.120**
(0.061)
0.851**
(0.408)
0.498
(0.473)

0.0001
(0.0002)
0.030**
(0.013)
0.212**
(0.094)
0.124
(0.115)

0.0002
(0.0007)
0.120**
(0.061)
0.853**
(0.411)
0.488
(0.499)

0.0001
(0.0002)
0.030**
(0.013)
0.212**
(0.095)
0.121
(0.122)

-0.019
(0.019)

-0.005
(0.004)

-0.007
(0.126)
-0.002
(0.017)

Press freedom*corruption

n=70
Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
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-0.006
(0.157)
-0.060
(0.048)

Just like with the change in corruption it is important to calculate the marginal effects of
corruption when voters are made aware of the level of corruption. The marginal effects for the
variables that are not interacted with each other are shown in the columns labeled AME for
Average Marginal Effects. The results show that the number of challengers and same candidate
are the variables that are consistently significant in all the models. In Model 1 level of
democracy is also significant. The results are shown in Table 16. As can be seen information on
the level of corruption has no effect on the election outcome. Thus people are cognizant of the
fact that the level of corruption may be a result of previous governments and therefore they
(voters) do not punish the incumbents for the abuse of resources by other previous governments.
This is unlike when voters are aware of the level of corruption that has been committed by the
incumbent party. In this case of a change in corruption there is some evidence that when voters
are presented with information on corruption, the reelection chances of the incumbent party
presidential candidate dwindles.
Table 17: Marginal Effects of the Information Variables for PROBIT Models with Corruption Measured in
Levels
Value of
Region=1
Region=0
categorical
variable :
Fraud=1
Fraud=0
Fraud=1
Fraud=0
same
candidate
(2)
(4)
(2)
(4)
(2)
(4)
(2)
(4)
Same
0.0001
-0.0029
0.0001
-0.0028
0.0003
-0.0050
0.0003
-0.0049
candidate = 1
(0.0001) (0.0039)
(0.0001) (0.0028)
(0.0004) (0.0071)
(0.0003) (0.0058)
Same
candidate = 0

0.0004

-0.0065

0.0004

-0.0064

0.0005

-0.0075

0.0005

-0.0075

(0.0004)

(0.0072)

(0.0003)

(0.0064)

(0.0004)

(0.0079)

(0.0004)

(0.0079)
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Next turnout is included in the model as an endogenous variable. The IVPROBIT results
are shown in Table 18.
Table 18: IVPROBIT with Corruption Measured in Levels

Turnout
Level of corruption
Fraud
Democracy
Change in GDP per
capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radios per 1000
pop.

(1)
Reelection
-0.048***
(0.018)
-0.186
(0.178)
0.025
(0.541)
-0.218
(0.156)

-1.482
(1.161)
3.375
(3.925)
0.251
(0.559)

(5)
Reelection
-0.058***
(0.013)
0.373
(0.341)
-0.101
(0.561)
-0.192
(0.122)

0.001
(0.001)
0.092*
(0.052)
0.837**
(0.356)
0.775
(0.516)

0.004
(0.004)
0.090
(0.275)
2.219
(3.666)
9.175*
(5.170)

0.003***
(0.001)

0.007
(0.009)

Turnout

Radio*corruption

-3.634
(3.071)
4.227
(4.300)
0.146
(0.584)

(9)
Reelection
-0.021
(0.029)
-0.329
(0.216)
0.062
(0.603)
-0.233
(0.176)

0.001
(0.001)
0.129**
(0.060)
0.929**
(0.375)
0.839
(0.524)

0.005
(0.004)
0.073
(0.283)
1.445
(3.863)
9.027*
(5.130)

0.000
(0.001)
0.112*
(0.061)
0.798**
(0.406)
0.422
(0.479)

0.003
(0.004)
0.103
(0.234)
0.839
(3.533)
6.500
(4.399)

0.000
(0.001)
0.110*
(0.061)
0.802**
(0.405)
0.396
(0.527)

0.003
(0.004)
0.068
(0.249)
1.068
(3.539)
6.218
(4.501)

0.009**
(0.004)
-0.001*
(0.001)

-0.023
(0.032)
0.004
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.026)

0.382***
(0.131)

0.036
(0.144)

0.850
(0.720)

-0.005
(0.018)

-0.066
(0.098)

Turnout

Press freedom

Turnout

-0.823
(1.271)
6.354**
(3.230)
-0.590
(0.488)

Press
freedom*corruption
Compulsory voting
laws
Wald chi2 (k-1)
Wald test of
exogeneity
Chi 2(1)
n=70

7.497***
(2.123)

7.768***
(2.173)

(13)
Reelection Turnout
-0.022
(0.032)
0.026
3.529
(1.187)
(6.829)
0.036
5.830*
(0.607)
(3.309)
-0.244
-0.595
(0.181)
(0.483)

6.976***
(1.539)

6.815***
(1.575)

40.570

64.520

20.120

20.410

4.780

9.330

1.160

1.080

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
k=number of parameters
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From Table 18 the Wald test of exogeneity proves the endogeneity of voter turnout for
models that use number of radios per 1000 population as the information variable (Models 1 and
2). Models 3 and Model 4 use press freedom as the information variable and in these models
voter turnout fails the endogeneity test. Hence in Table 19, only marginal effects for Models 1
and 2 are provided.
Table 19: Marginal Effects of Uninteracted Terms with
Corruption Measured in Levels
Turnout
Corruption level
Electoral fraud
Democracy
Change in GDP per capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radios per 1000 population

(1)
-0.012**
(0.005)
-0.047
(0.042)
0.006
(0.136)
-0.055*
(0.036)
0.00015
(0.00014)
0.023**
(0.011)
0.210***
(0.081)
0.194
(0.120)
0.0006***
(0.0002)

(2)
-0.014***
(0.004)

-0.024
(0.135)
-0.046**
(0.027)
0.00018*
(0.00014)
0.031***
(0.012)
0.224***
(0.077)
0.203*
(0.113)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Two tail test conducted for turnout and region only

Voter turnout, level of democracy, number of challengers, same candidate and number of
radios are significant in Model 1. Compared with the case where the change in corruption is
used (Table 6: Model 5) instead of the level of corruption, change in GDP per capita and region
are no longer significant. In Model 2 the marginal effects of the interacted terms are not included
and are reported in Table 20. The same variables that are significant in Model 1 are also
significant in Model 2. Region becomes significant in Model 2.
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In Table 20 information on corruption does not affect the reelection chances of the
incumbent party’s presidential candidate- a similar result found when probit estimation is used.
Table 20: Marginal Effects of the Information Variables for PROBIT Models with Corruption
Measured in Levels
Region=1
Same candidate = 1

Same candidate = 0

Region=0

Fraud=1

Fraud=0

Fraud=1

Fraud=0

0.0004

0.0096

0.0235

0.0223

(0.0003)

(0.0249)

(0.0689)

(0.0624)

0.0245
(0.0707)

0.0234
(0.0652)

0.0239
(0.0643)

0.0249
(0.0695)

Recall that in Table 20 the marginal effects are calculated only for Model 2 because
Model 4 fails the endogeneity test. Notice also that the marginal effects are calculated taking into
account the 3 exogenous dummy variables (electoral fraud, region and same candidate).
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C2

DEPENDENT VARIBLE: CHANGE IN INCUMBENT’S SHARE OF VOTES
In order to check whether or not voters withdraw their support from corrupt incumbent

parties, like other studies have done, the change in the share of the incumbent party’s candidate
is used as the dependent variable. The next section provides the results for the OLS and IVREG
estimations and briefly explains the effect of the variable of interest, corruption on the incumbent
party’s share of votes.
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C2.1

ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)
Table 21 provides results for the estimation using Ordinary Least Squares. Model 1 and

Model 2 control for the quantity of information using the number of radios per 1000 of
population. In Model 1 corruption has no significant effect on the share of votes an incumbent
party candidate receives. In Model 2 corruption is interacted with radio to control for the amount
of information on corruption that is relayed to the citizens. Corruption is still insignificant.
Table 21: OLS Estimation for Change in the Share of the Incumbent
Party’s Candidate Votes with Corruption Measured in Levels
Turnout
Corruption
Electoral fraud
Democracy
Change in GDP per capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radios per 1000 pop.

(1)
-0.332*
(0.194)
-6.276**
(2.906)
-5.777
(7.046)
-2.283**
(1.099)
-0.011
(0.010)
-0.591
(0.515)
13.000**
(6.163)
-3.585
(7.522)
0.018
(0.016)

Radio*corruption

(2)
-0.330*
(0.195)
-3.263
(5.475)
-6.893
(7.287)
-2.134**
(1.128)
-0.012
(0.011)
-0.567
(0.519)
13.994**
(6.380)
-3.042
(7.607)
0.059
(0.065)
-0.006
(0.009)

Press freedom

(3)
-0.147
(0.201)
-8.027***
(2.819)
-9.791
(7.433)
-1.714*
(1.160)
-0.013
(0.010)
-0.681
(0.509)
13.192**
(6.112)
-6.689
(6.737)

(4)
-0.150
(0.204)
-6.648
(13.256)
-9.969
(7.682)
-1.721*
(1.172)
-0.013
(0.010)
-0.692
(0.524)
13.263**
(6.202)
-6.716
(6.801)

-0.370
(0.244)

-0.222
(1.414)
-0.021
(0.198)
0.295
2.340

Press freedom*corruption
R-squared
F(k, n-(k+1)

0.282
2.490

0.288
2.260

0.294
2.640

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
k=number of independent variables
n=67

In Model 1 corruption is significant implying that voters withdraw support for the
incumbent. Radio is not significant but a joint significant test of corruption and radio shows that
they are significant.
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C2.2

INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSION
Table 22: IVREG for Change in the Share of the Incumbent
Party’s Candidate Votes with Corruption Measured in Levels
Turnout
Corruption
Electoral fraud
Democracy
Change in GDP per capita
# of challengers
Same candidate
Region
# of radios per 100 pop.

(7)
-1.184**
(0.587)
-7.866**
(3.512)
-3.954
(8.235)
-2.195*
(1.273)
-0.010
(0.012)
-0.564
(0.596)
16.767**
(7.523)
-2.140
(8.753)
0.038*
(0.022)

Radio*corruption

(8)
-1.229**
(0.587)
-5.371
(6.555)
-4.812
(8.651)
-2.063
(1.326)
-0.011
(0.013)
-0.541
(0.610)
17.826*
(7.840)
-1.596
(8.978)
0.074
(0.077)
-0.005
(0.011)

Press freedom

(9)
-0.633
(0.507)
-8.876***
(3.069)
-6.467
(8.420)
-2.077
(1.266)
-0.013
(0.011)
-0.672
(0.535)
14.413**
(6.523)
-8.488
(7.279)

(10)
-0.665
(0.534)
-3.232
(14.360)
-7.062
(8.562)
-2.122
(1.294)
-0.014
(0.011)
-0.717
(0.553)
14.758**
(6.697)
-8.674
(7.414)

-0.134
(0.340)

0.487
(1.636)
-0.087
(0.219)
0.214

Press freedom*corruption
R-squared

0.039

0.017

0.222

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For the instrumental variable approach, there is also evidence that the share of votes for the
incumbent declines as a result of corruption. However, just like when corruption was measured by the
change, this size of the decline may not be enough to cause the incumbent to lose.
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